RELATING THE PHYSICS AND RELIGION OF DAVID BOHM
by Kevin J. Sharpe
ABSTRACT.
David Bohm's thinking has become widely publicized since the 1982 performance
of a form of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment. Bohm's holomovement
theory, in particular, tries to explain the nonlocality which the experiment
supports. His theories are close to his metaphysical and religious thinking.
Fritjof Capra's writings try something similar: supporting a theory (the
bootstrap theory) because it is close to his religious beliefs. Both Bohm and
Capra appear to use their religious ideas in their physics. Religion is the
source for physical hypotheses and provides the motivation to develop and
uphold them.
KEYWORDS.
David Bohm, holomovement, religion and science, Fritjof Capra, nonlocality,
physics.
David
Bohm started his career in physics as a brilliant exponent of the accepted
point of view. In the early 1950s he changed. Since then, his theories have
been controversial. Most physicists do not accept them. Yet Bohm wrestles with
basic questions raised by contemporary quantum physics. He does not escape
physics into a world of his own. He asks questions of the accepted physics and,
using its techniques, tries to solve them. One of his principle drives is to
clarify an idea he finds at the heart of quantum physics. It is connectedness.
Every thing connects with everything else.
Bohm
has a strong philosophical and religious sense. Physics also immerses him. His
religion appears to influence his physics, as well as the other way around. In
this paper I will explore a little of his physics and his religion. I will look
at some of their connections. The nonlocality illustrated by the EPR experiment
will be my focus.
Nonlocality
For
Bohm, one of the significant and novel features of quantum theory appears in
the EPR paradox. Its name comes from the first letters of its authors, Albert
Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, who published an article on it in
1935 (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935). Bohm helped to develop it further in
1951 (Bohm 1951, 611-23). In this thought experiment certain events appear
connected, but they do not physically interact with each other and are some
distance apart.
A
simplified version of the EPR experiment is as follows. A particle enters the
experimental device. It has the properties that it is not spinning and can be
split in half. It is split with each half heading off in opposite directions.
One half is spinning in one direction and the other half is spinning in the
opposite direction. The total spin must be zero by the conservation of spin at
the point at which the parent split. The parent particle had zero spin and
equal but opposite spins cancel each other out. When the two halves are some
distance apart one half has its spin changed. The question concerns what
happens to the spin of the other half. It would instantaneously change so the
conservation of spin holds. How could it do this? It is a blatant contradiction
of physics as Einstein understood it.
One
way to approach this question is to ask about the connection between the two
half particles. What tells the second half that its sibling has changed its
spin? Normal connections do not travel faster than light. The EPR experiment,
however, requires a connection which travels faster than light. This conflicts
with Einstein's relativity theory in which nothing can travel at such speeds.
Einstein's
original intention in pointing to this problem was to bring out a difficulty
with quantum theory. The instantaneous connection between particles suggested
by quantum physics is a base for the EPR experiment. However, the experiment
contradicts the idea that connections cannot travel faster than the speed of
light. Thus it disproves, to Einstein at least, the validity of quantum
physics.
Unlike
Einstein, however, Bohm and his colleagues do not interpret the result of the
EPR experiment as illustrating a problem in quantum physics. They see it as
representing an essential new feature in quantum phenomena. Moreover, they do
not think it contradicts relativity. They have another way of explaining it
(Bohm and Hiley 1980).
The
experiment is an example of a nonlocal effect. This means that something
affects something else which is not within its immediate area. Neither is there
a normal causal connection between the two; for instance, there are no physical
forces connecting them. Nonlocality contrasts with the common-sense
"principle of local causes", or locality. This says the following.
Take two places some distance apart. Take them at the same moment of time. What
happens in one has nothing to do with what happens at the other (Stapp 1977,
314). The opposite idea, nonlocality, is sensational. Physics violates common
sense once again. The public interest arouses from its slumber.
The
EPR paper is Einstein's most famous statement of his dislike of the nonlocality
in Niels Bohr's quantum theory. Einstein writes that physics should be
"free from spooky actions from a distance [that is, nonlocality]".
Locality was necessary in his relativity theory and he took it as being an
"absolutely inevitable requirement for any reasonable physical
theory" (Bohm and Hiley 1980, 51).
For
many years the EPR experiment existed only in the imaginations of physicists.
John Bell was a primary force in changing that. In a paper published in 1964 he
distinguished precisely and mathematically the experimental results of the two
types of theories (
Experimental
evidence for nonlocality did exist to some extent in 1957 (Bohm and Aharonov
1957). However, the unambigous carrying out of an EPR experiment had to wait
until the 1980s. A team headed by Alain Aspect performed the decisive
experiment, which most physicists now accept (Aspect, Dalibard and Roger 1982).
It turns out to violate
Bohm
and Basil Hiley leave us with a warning. We may want to accept nonlocality. We
may even want to see it in all situations. Thus we may think of everything as
connected to everything else regardless of their separations in time and space.
The evidence, however, does not support doing this. The connection between
objects at the quantum level may only apply in certain circumstances. An
example is "over relatively short distances for simple systems". It
can also appear in complex systems and over somewhat longer distances with the
temperature near absolute zero. Thus breaking systems into independent
subsystems as required by classical physics is often quite acceptable. Bohm and
Hiley believe "nonlocality will only reveal itself in very subtle
ways". They want to explore "the precise conditions under which such
effects appear" (Bohm and Hiley 1976, 178).
Interpreting and Resolving Nonlocality
The
results of Aspect's EPR experiment uphold quantum physics and its nonlocality.
However, they challenge our usual understandings of, for example, space, time
and matter. "As physicists we have learned to live with this [experiment],
but we have never really come to terms with it." So conclude F. Frescura
and Hiley (Frescura and Hiley 1980, 8). John Clauser and Abner Shimony think
similarly. "Either one must. . .abandon the realistic philosophy of most
working scientists, or dramatically revise our concept of space-time"
(Clauser and Shimony 1978, 1881). Speculations run wild. There are many
conflicting approaches and interpretations. Must we have nonlocality or can we
rewrite physics to keep locality? If we do have to have nonlocality, how are we
to understand why it is there? What causes nonlocality?
Approaches
which accept nonlocality differ from common sense. Nonlocality itself is not
common sense. Some approaches go so far as to conflict with acceptable physics.
T.M. Helliwell and D.A. Konkowski ask about influences travelling faster than
the speed of light (Helliwell and Konkowski 1983, 1000). Could there be a
relativity-disobedient faster-than-light "elaborate signalling
mechanism" between the two particles in the experiment? (Gribbin 1984,
228-29). Or do the particles somehow know what is going on with each other? An
"unattractive proposition" to Hiley (Hiley 1977, 413). Jack Sarfatti
suggests a faster-than-light transfer of information without signals. Perhaps
it connects the two particles immediately and intimately (Zukav 1979, 310-14).
Shimony offers a property called passion. It allows the instantaneous matching
of the behaviors of two particles far apart. It does this without them
interacting via any forces classical physics knows about. There is some form of
communication which does not involve information passing as we know it.
Jean-Pierre Vigier replies: "Passion without interaction isn't
satisfying" (Anon 1986, 12).
Some
approaches move in a different direction than those above. One comes from
Itamar Pitowsky. He claims the EPR experiments only point to a problem with the
theory of probability used in quantum physics. Changes to this theory allow him
to sidestep
An
unconventional way of presenting quantum theory makes use of hidden variables.
Quantum theory principally deals with the quantum or subatomic level. This is
the level of the world where exist electrons and other objects smaller than the
atom. These make up atoms. Continuing down the scale, hidden variables help
make up the objects of the subatomic level. They are some of the basic building
blocks which go in to making such particles as electrons.
The
behavior of the hidden variables determines the behavior of particles at the
quantum level. It is like understanding the behavior of a nest of ants as the
net outcome of the behavior of each ant in the nest. This creates a problem. It
contradicts the usual approach to quantum physics whose uncertainty principle
says there is no way to determine the behavior of subatomic particles. There is
only a chance that an electron, for instance, has a particular position and
velocity. We cannot make two definite statements about the electron. We may know
that it is in such and such a place. Then we cannot know the velocity at which
it is travelling. It is not possible according to the usual quantum physics to
be precise about two such properties at once. A theory of hidden variables,
however, says that in principle it is possible to be precise about them. All we
need to know is the behavior of the hidden variables of the system. Then we can
predict with certainty - within experimental error - what will be the behavior
of the electron. To so fly in the face of the accepted approach creates major
opposition to hidden variables theories.
Einstein
made use of hidden variables in his EPR paper. He first showed that the
nonlocality of accepted quantum physics leads to faster-than-light
communication. This is unacceptable. He then rebuilt quantum theory using
hidden variables and suggested that his new theory resolves the EPR problem.
Since the hidden variables would underlie the existence and behaviors of both
particles in the experiment, they could determine the simultaneous spin
changes. It is like pushing one button to cause two effects.
However,
the hidden variables of Einstein are local
hidden variables. He hoped they would help remove the so-called
strange nonlocality he saw in quantum physics. He was wrong. The Aspect
experiment rules out their existence. Physics must abandon his alternative base
for quantum theory.
Thus
we need to come to terms with the nonlocality of quantum physics. The question
is how to explain it.
Bohm
has built a couple of bases for quantum physics which differ from the usual
approach. One uses nonlocal hidden variables. It agrees with the EPR
experiments. Bohm can explain how nonlocality occurs, and thereby help us come
to terms with it (Bohm and Hiley 1984, 260-62).[1]
For him there is no faster-than-light signalling or an instantaneous awareness.
Rather he suggests there is something including or underlying simultaneous but
distant events. This underlying something means the events are not distinct
(Bohm and Aharonov 1957, 1072). There is a type of connection between events at
the quantum level even if they happen simultaneously.
Several
physicists follow Bohm. Richard Mattuck lists reasons why nonlocal hidden
variables theories have merit:
First,
such models can yield agreement with quantum physics. Second, they can solve
the quantum measurement problem [a puzzle raised by the usual quantum physics].
Third, history shows us that it is risky to reject theories on the grounds that
they defy "common-sense". Fourth, these models may reflect a [basic],
inescapable nonlocality in nature itself (Mattuck 1981, 331).
The Holomovement Theory of Bohm
Hidden
variables theories are one of the ways Bohm tries to understand and explain
such quantum phenomena as nonlocality. Another is to develop his holomovement
or implicate order ideas. These center on the notion of unbroken wholeness.
They deny the dominant picture of the world as made up of separate and
independent parts.[2]
One
of the ideas used by Bohm and Hiley to describe unbroken wholeness is that of a
system. Classical physics studies each part of the universe as separate. The
parts come together to explain the whole. Bohm and Hiley, however, take the
relationships between the parts and the qualities of a part as dependent on the
whole. They do this even if for practical purposes they approximate the part as
being separate. Thus they do not see the world made up of independent
elementary parts arranged into systems. Rather, each part connects with every
other part at the quantum level. The whole universe is the basic reality. The
system of the whole is what comes first. The separate parts are only temporary
approximations (Bohm and Hiley 1975, 101-6).
Bohm
and Hiley divide reality into supersystem, system and subsystem. They do not,
of course, assume as does classical physics that subsystems explain their
larger system. Or that a subsystem is independent of its larger system.
Subsystems are usually dependent on the systems that include them. Subsystems
and their larger systems form a chain up to the whole universe.
The
emphasis on dependency is what Bohm calls wholeness of form. It means that a
complete description is never possible. Every system is in a supersystem. A
theory that claims it is complete has closed itself off from the unknown whole
into which everything merges.
The
idea of a system is only a start of Bohm's trying to develop the notion of
unbroken wholeness. And it is easier to understand than his others. Another
revolves around the holomovement. The holomovement is what is basic to reality.
"What is is the
holomovement" (Bohm 1980, 178).
There
are two essential properties of the holomovement.
The
holomovement model for reality comes from the properties of a holographic image
of an object. This forms on a photographic plate by capturing a certain pattern
of light. This pattern is the interaction or interference pattern of two
portions of a beam of laser light. One beam reflects off an object. The other
reflects off a mirror. Lighting the photographic plate with a laser will produce
an image of the object which has three dimensions. In addition, the plate has
the property that an image of the whole object forms by lighting any portion of
the plate. When lighting a piece of the plate the image will have less detail
than when lighting the whole plate. The smaller the portion of the plate lit
up, the less the detail. The point is still the same, however. Any portion of
the holographic plate (the hologram) contains information on the whole object
(Bohm 1973, 144-45).
The
major point about the hologram, according to Bohm, is not the photographic
plate. Rather, it is that movement is always taking place (Bohm 1978, 91).
Light waves from the laser are continually interfering with those reflected off
the object. The interference pattern is a moving web of the light waves
interacting with each other in that region of space. The holographic plate
captures a record of the moving pattern. The first aspect of the holomovement to notice has to do with
the movement part of the word. Rather than taking something essentially static
and rigid as the basis for their new order, Bohm and his colleagues propose to
make activity basic (Hiley 1980, 94).
Psychological and neurological research shows that the idea of an unchanging object is a device we learn in early childhood. Bohm continues by suggesting there is a more primitive level of perception than that of objects. Movement, or change, or breaks in regular arrangements, are basic. From the confusing mass of movements that we sense, our minds make stable simplifications. From these in turn we build the objects we see as relatively fixed or slowly moving (Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970, 175). Bohm thinks that our common-sense descriptions of objects as unchanging are devices we learn to think of as primary. Classical physics mirrors this common-sense approach.
Grammar
also mirrors this object metaphysics our culture conditions us to accept. For
instance, the noun, the indicator of an object, has a primary grammatical role.
However, verbs, which call attention to action, have a secondary status. Bohm
wants us to stop taking objects as primitive. He wants to give the basic role
to the verb and think of nouns as being creations from verbs. Thus Bohm's new
approach to language emphasizes movement and activity (Bohm 1980, chap. 2).
The second element of the holomovement is
that of undivided or unbroken wholeness. The word holomovement uses the prefix
holo from the Greek word meaning whole. It refers to the unbroken and undivided
movement which Bohm takes as basic (Hiley 1980, 78).
The
wholeness parts of the holomovement idea draw on the hologram. The photographic
plate of the hologram records the interference pattern of the light present in
its region of space. Within this pattern, and therefore in the plate, is the
whole lit up object. The whole object becomes part of the light in each region
of space.
Bohm
builds the hologram into a general idea of undivided wholeness. He suggests
that each region of space and time contains in it the total order of the
universe. This includes the past, the present and the future (Bohm 1980, 177).
Bohm thinks of everything as folded into everything. He uses the idea of the
implicate order. The word implicate comes from the verb to implicate, to fold
inward. Reality as implicate means for Bohm that any portion of it involves
every other portion. Each portion of reality contains information on every
other portion within it. One could say that each region of space and time
contains the total structure of the universe within it. The whole is in some
sense contained in any region (Bohm 1973, 146-47).
The
holomovement is an example of the implicate order. Bohm defines the
holomovement to be that which carries an implicate order. The movement of the
holomovement in each region carries information on every other part of reality.
This parallels the hologram. With it the movement of light in each segment of
space carries information on the whole lit up object.
Bohm and his colleagues rebuild quantum theory from their informal language centered on the holomovement. They claim the holographic image to be more adequate for the reality quantum theory describes than is the usual approach. The latter, they claim, still relies in part on classical metaphysics (Bohm 1978, 37-38). In particular, the holomovement physics explains nonlocality. In the holomovement, the basic connections between elements are neither local nor nonlocal. They are, rather, alocal or neutral concerning locality. The nonlocal connections of the EPR experiment can be thought of as coming from the more basic alocal connections of the holomovement (Hiley 1980, 93).
The Metaphysics and Religion of Bohm
The
wider physics community determine if Bohm's theories stand or fall as physics.
This applies to his hidden variables, holomovement, and other theories. People
who are not physicists cannot pass judgement on it. At the moment most
physicists do not accept it; only time and experiments will tell. The only
experimental test of his ideas involved the second of his hidden variables
theories. It fell to the usual quantum physics (Papaliolios 1967). The current
strength of Bohm's physical theories is that they overcome perplexities in the
usual approach (for example, Bohm and Hiley 1984).
A
danger is using Bohm's theories out of context. Some writers use his physical
theories to support their metaphysics as if the weight of physics is behind
Bohm. It is not (Bohm and Hiley 1976).
On
the other hand, his theories are also metaphysics. The holomovement theory is
an example. Its evaluation as a metaphysics does not necessarily depend on its
success or failure as physics. Some theologians think it may be useful as a
base for their discipline (for example, see
There is a religious and philosophical background to Bohm and his theories. They do not come out of a vacuum.
Bohm
grew up in a Jewish household. Eastern mysticism has influenced him since then.
The Indian philosopher Jiddu Krishnamurti, in whom Bohm first became interested
in 1959, has had a special role. Bohm has always had a sense of the wholeness
of nature and a drive to break free from conventional ideas. Many he finds
distorting and inappropriate. He writes: "it is far more dangerous to
adhere to illusion than to face what the actual fact is." What is the
point of life, he continues, if one lives in an invented world? There is none
if there is no relationship to people, the world, or anything (Briggs and Peat
1987, 70; and Temple 1982, 361-63).
The
metaphysical beliefs which Bohm holds lies under as well as inspires his
physics. What follows in this section describes part of Bohm's metaphysical
base. It introduces us to some of his beliefs that have helped shape his
physics. The beliefs are also religious in the sense that they resemble ideas
from some religions.
That
reality has an endless depth is
one of the core ideas in Bohm's metaphysics. What we know of reality does not
exhaust it. Our scientific knowledge may grasp its significance to a marked
extent. Its properties and qualities will, however, always be beyond us. We
cannot imagine or sense by intuition how far reality lies beyond our knowledge.
Bohm writes that every object and process has infinitely many sides to it. The
laws and the ideas used by science at any time only partly express the objects
or processes supposedly covered (Bohm 1976, 3).
However, reality must have some stability.
Otherwise, Bohm suggests, there could not even be such approximate
representations as scientific theories. For the predictions of a theory to be
right at least some of the time reality must have some stability.
Since
nature is always beyond human knowledge, Bohm says that a theory is only a
limited insight. It is like a light shining on some aspects of reality,
penetrating to an extent into the open and unknown. Thus one ought to expect a
continuing development of quite different insights. There should not be a
steady approach towards some fixed knowledge which is what the world supposedly
really is. Bohm interprets the history of science as fitting well with his idea
of the unending creation of new forms of insight. Each form is in harmony with
the real world only to a certain extent. The unclear features of a theory need
looking at not only to try clearing them up. They may not have a resolution.
They may point towards new forms of insight (Bohm 1976, 3).
That
the parts of reality relate to
each other is another core idea. Bohm emphasizes the wholeness of reality.
Every segment selected from it connects with any other segment. Isolating
pieces from it simplifies it and can distort its true character.
Bohm frequently raises the question of relation or its opposite, fragmentation. In an article entitled "Fragmentation in Science and Society", he writes that science and technology have flaws. They have damaging results for society. This is because they reflect an important problem in society itself: fragmentation. No human act, no element of life or of environment, no human activity is an island. Any more than is an individual person. However, people deal with these fragments as separate objects. People do not think how the fragments act with each other within wholes. Bohm continues by opposing fragmentation to wholeness with its dynamic character moving in cycles. He directs us to think in wholes (Bohm 1970, 159).
This
emphasis on the connections between objects and events often appears in Bohm's
physics. A thorough mechanist emphasizes an objectivity of uninvolved and
distant physicists. Bohm opposes this to a more person-involving subjectivity
found by emphasizing relations. He thinks that the former is inadequate. It can
become an authoritarian faith. Rather there needs to be an openness between the
two approaches. He seeks a close relationship between the subjective and
objective. Neither can stand in totality; they are two views of the one reality
(Bohm 1974).
The
third core idea is that of movement.
The whole and any piece of reality are constantly in process, in movement, in
activity. "Rocks, trees, people, electrons, atoms, planets, galaxies, are.
. .the centers or foci of vast processes, extending ultimately over the whole
universe" (Bohm 1969, 42). Each piece of reality is constantly changing.
Each center or focus of change refers to some aspect of the total or overall
process of the universe.
There are connections between the three metaphysical ideas mentioned above. For instance, the latter two support the first by suggesting two ways in which reality has a depth. Its isolated segments relate with e-ach other and are always moving. Any freeze is artificial.
Two
further ideas which have their roots in the above three also exist in Bohm's
writings. The first is that the movement of reality is creative. Reality is always
transforming itself. "There are no basic objects, entities, or substances,
but. . .all that [we can observe] comes into existence. . .remains relatively
stable for some time, and then passes out of existence" (Bohm 1969, 43).
Each piece of reality continuously forms, reforms, transforms, and ceases to
be.
The
second additional property, the fifth in all, is that reality divides into levels. In turn the levels are in
systems of hierarchies. This is one way to represent the qualitative infinity
of nature, its endless depth (Bohm 1969, 51-58).
The
world contains infinitely many levels. A set of laws based perhaps on
probabilities, direct causes, or both, characterizes each level. The validity
of a set of laws does not have to go beyond the level to which it belongs. On
leaving a particular level, quite different processes may appear. To describe
them requires a new set of laws (Feyerabend 1960, 328-30).
Reality
has an endless depth. It divides into levels. Its parts relate to each other.
The whole and every piece of it is constantly creative and in process. These
are the beliefs of Bohm outlined above. There are others as well, including the
following. Consciousness is material with its origin in the holomovement.
Fragmentation and chaos infect consciousness and the world. And there is
something beyond the world and the holomovement (Bohm and Weber 1978). The
holomovement theory developed by Bohm for physics and philosophy is an
expression of his underlying beliefs.
Capra and The Bootstrap Theory
Fritjof
Capra stirred recent interest in the comparison between physics and such
metaphysical or religious ideas as wholeness with his book The Tao of Physics. His subtitle
explains his work: an "exploration of the parallels between modern physics
and Eastern mysticism".
The
companion article to this by Robert Clifton and Marilyn Regehr explains and
critiques Capra's thinking (Clifton and Regehr 1990).[3]
They interpret Capra as tying his religious beliefs to physical theories. Their
chief problem with his approach is its danger. Physical theories can change and
have several interpretations. This fickleness will pass to any religious beliefs
wed to the physics.
I
find Clifton and Regehr's criticism unclear. They do not say why it is
unhealthy to have religious beliefs which can change and be open to various
interpretations. What is wrong with having a theology called into question
because science has replaced its base? Why do we want a theology that is
somehow permanent? On the contrary, it is healthy to question a theology as
society and its ideas change. Each theology builds from a metaphysics which can
go out of vogue. A theology also assumes a social order which we question.
Liberation theology does this admirably. Clifton and Regehr also point to the
problem of a physical theory having several interpretations. This is true for
all fields, theology transgressing more than most. One has to live with this
problem and justify the interpretation one eventually takes.
Clifton and Regehr propose an alternative to tying religious ideas to physical theory, while still having some relationship between physics and theology. They propose a solution to what they call the positive conformity problem (Clifton and Regehr 1990, 18???). It asks two questions. Why can we present the interaction between us and the world in rigorous mathematical terms? Second, why can we be so successful in using this to predict what might happen? This capacity allows us to control the world. They base their solution on the belief that God created human beings. He intentionally gave us those innate qualities with which we describe and predict our interactions with the physical world.
There
are nonreligious answers to the positive conformity problem which Clifton and
Regehr have not considered. For instance, considering the evolution and
development of human belief systems produces a solution. A function of a belief
system is to increase the believing group's chances of survival. Control of the
environment is essential to human survival. All belief systems must enable the
control of the environment to some extent or other for the believing group to
survive. Further, the better is a belief system at controlling the world, the
more likely it is to survive, flourish and dominate. Western science appears
better at doing this than are other belief systems (Sharpe 1984, 48-49, 105).
Another
approach compares the physical matter of our brains and the physical matter of
the universe outside of our brains. They are the same. The brain and non-brain
stuff obey the same laws. Thus our theories as products of our brains may
reflect the laws which control our brains and the world.
Clifton
and Regehr promote their interesting solution in the following ways. First it
reassures those who hold a theistic faith. Their faith is reasonable and they
do not have to seek for its confirmation from science. Second, it sidesteps
science's changing nature and its various interpretations. Third, it satisfies
the theist by not separating science and theism into two unrelated realms
(Clifton and Regehr 1990, 21???).
My
possible solutions to the problem, however, undermine the theist's reassurance
granted by Clifton and Regehr. For many people my suggestions may be more
reasonable than appealing to the theistic competitor. Thus we have not secured
a place for God. God does not fill this gap. Nor does Clifton and Regehr's
proposal escape the changing nature of science and its having different
interpretations. This is because there may come a time when changes in science
open it up to explain the positive conformity question. Perhaps my proposals
may lead to such explanations. Then we have to deal with the many interpretations
of the theory. Finally, rather than avoiding the segregation of theism and
science, their proposal may promote it. Theirs is a competitor to natural
explanations such I have sketched. When faced with this, theists may want to
dig their heels more deeply into their beliefs.
Thus
I find Clifton and Regehr's criticism and alternative to Capra's work
unconvincing. They do not show the error in tying religious beliefs to
scientific theories. Neither does their approach work; theology cannot be
immune to changes in science while still in dialogue with it. Their theological
answer may have scientific competitors which may be more adequate. I am
skeptical about having that dialogue while saying one side cannot change the
other.
Most
critics of Capra, including Clifton and Regehr, overlook an aspect of his work.
He is intending something more than pointing out the parallels. He is also
intending more than seeking a validation of his religious beliefs from physics,
as Clifton and Regehr believe. The reverse direction, using the religious
beliefs in physics, may also be part of his work. Eastern mysticism may, for
instance, help in solving certain standard puzzles in quantum theory. One of
Capra's parallels between physics and Eastern mysticism is the bootstrap theory.
When raising this Capra moves beyond seeing the similarities. Rather, he is
seeking an influence of mysticism on physics.
Capra
suggests the bootstrap theory not only as a physical theory, but also as a
vision, a metaphysic, of the universe. Bootstrappers believe the universe is a
dynamic web of related events with no basic parts or properties, be they laws,
equations or principles. Any property of a part of the universe follows from
the properties of all the other parts. The harmony of all the relationships
between the parts determines the structure of the entire web. Moreover, they
believe that the structure of the universe at the subatomic level follows
directly from a few general ideas which they think are important. They explain
the universe's properties by its properties ("each particle helps to
generate other particles which in turn generate it"). In so doing they
have the universe pulling itself up by its own bootstraps (Capra 1977, 276,
291-92; Dull 1978, 389).
Perhaps
Capra puts forward the bootstrap idea because it is close to what he sees
Eastern mysticism to be. The latter is, after all, an experience of
considerable meaning and importance to him. I say this because Capra's way of
presenting the theory suggests that physics does accept it. It is, however, a
theory now out of vogue. It also faces many difficulties (Dull 1978, 388-89).
The quark competitor - which says there is a most elementary particle which
explains other particles - appears more successful and acceptable. Even Capra
admits there are considerable problems in setting up and confirming the
bootstrap theory (Capra 1977, 290).
Capra
appears to prefer the bootstrap theory for physics because it is similar to the
ideas of Eastern mysticism. This does not mean it has no use or truth as a
theory for physics. It is to say that part of the drive for suggesting and
upholding it lies for Capra in his belief that it is true. Capra has energy for
trying to show that it is more adequate and truthful than its competitors. Some
of his energy comes from his personal religious or mystical experience. In this
way Capra's religion is influencing his science. He supports and develops a
physical theory because it is more or less the same as his religious belief.[4]
Capra
says he is not proposing a synthesis of science and mysticism. In some places
he is even quite clear about their separation. One does not contain the other,
he believes. Physics and mysticism complement each other. Each provides a type
of understanding, a mode of knowing, which the other cannot be (Capra 1977,
297). I do not agree with him. By saying this he is misleading us. His
proposing and using the bootstrap theory contradicts the separation.
Bohm's Religion and Physics
John
Schumacher and Robert Anderson in their "Defense of Mystical Science"
want to reconcile science and mysticism. They want to synthesize them. From
this they hope for "a new and fuller science" (Schumacher and
Anderson 1979, 73). There is considerable interest at present in the possible
similarities between some central ideas of contemporary physics and those of
Eastern mysticism. As Schumacher and Anderson suggest, there is even interest
in developing a new science. One based on what some consider to be truths
uncovered by Eastern mysticism. Capra's physics and religion are examples of
this development.
I
am suggesting two moves. One is from science to religion. Religion is using
scientific ideas in a variety of ways. The example Clifton and Regehr bring to
our notice is Capra. They suggest he is trying to support his religious beliefs
with physics. One could also construct a scientifically informed metaphysics,
or make religious ideas conform to science.
The
second move I am suggesting is from religion to science. This is what
Schumacher and Anderson refer to. They want to base science in some ways on
religious insights. Capra is trying to do this by introducing and upholding the
bootstrap theory.[5]
Bohm's
religious ideas also appear to shape his physics. He may be trying to use
religion in physics by his rebuilding of physics, making the latter spiritual
or mystical (Restivo 1983, 117, 121, 124).
There
are several reasons why I think Bohm is using religion in physics. First, he is
trying to create not only a physics, but an entire world-view beyond physics. I
suggest it also because of Bohm's own religious interests. The third reason
centers on his efforts to rebuild physics, what he accepts and what he rejects.
There is no convincing reason from physics for making the choices he does (Bohm
1971, 369-79; and Sharpe 1983, 48). Bohm's motivation may come from another
source as well, such as a religious one.
The
point is that Bohm's idea of undivided wholeness has its roots in religion or
mysticism. It may or may not be useful in physics. Bohm proposes it as a
physical hypothesis subject to the testing ground of physics. There is as well
a second contribution religion can make. It can create in a believer such as
Bohm the dedication, enthusiasm and tenacity to try to have his ideas accepted
as a physical theory. It does this despite the opposition and difficulties
involved.
The
physics of Bohm and Capra show that religion can try to add to the knowledge of
the hardest of the sciences, namely physics. Many religions, including
Christianity, have much to say about the nature and direction of the physical
world. They should not be afraid of bringing these ideas, in appropriate forms,
to the sciences. As hypotheses they are still, of course, open to the
strictures of factual support.
Notes
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Author's Footnote
Kevin J. Sharpe is a Core Faculty member of the
Union Graduate School, Cincinnati. He is also Executive Officer of the
Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS), and Director of the
International Division of Meyer, Stone and Co., Inc. His address is 65 Hoit
Road, Concord, New Hampshire 03301. This paper derives from one read to the
Annual Summer Conference of IRAS held on Star Island, New Hampshire,
July-August 1988.
[1]The reference also
outlines Bohm's quantum potential theory. This is his most recent approach,
closely related to his original hidden variables theory. Between proposing
these two theories he championed another hidden variables theory with Jeffrey
Bub (Bohm and Bub 1966).
[2]The hidden variables
theories are physics. They also have a metaphysical base. Presentations of the
holomovement/implicate order theories usually take them as a philosophy or
metaphysics. However, they also have a physics counterpart. Bohm and his
colleagues have modelled them mathematically (for example, Bohm 1973), even
though they now appear to have abandoned this approach.
[3]They have omitted
mentioning an important work on Capra, namely Restivo 1983.
[4]Clifton and Regehr tell
us that taking "theistic conceptions as physical hypotheses is simply misguided" (Clifton and
Regehr 1990, 18????). They do not say why this is so.
[5]Elsewhere I suggest a
ladder model as a way of thinking about this science-religion integration (Sharpe
1984, 86-91).