ENDNOTES

<1>:Barbour 1966: 326-7. Also see Birch 1979: 56-7; Hartshorne and Reese 1953; and Jaki 1966: Chap. 1.

<2>:See, for instance, Birch and Cobb 1981: 132-3.

<3>:Smith 1982: 668.

<4>:Capra 1977a.

<5>:Sharpe 1987.

<6>:Sharpe 1990; 1991.

<7>:Popper 1982: 36. See also Bohm 1988: 111-4; Jammer 1988: 692; and Sudbery 1988.

<8>:Bohm, Hillion, Takabayasi and Vigier 1960; Bohm, Hillion and Vigier 1960; and De Broglie, Bohm, Hillion, Halbwachs, Takabayasi and Vigier 1963: 438-9. That elementary particles are extended structures has become an important contemporary research question in the guise of superstring theories. See Anthony and Green 1985; Brown 1991; Davies and Brown 1988; Freedman and van Niewehuizen 1985; Green 1986; Taubes 1986; and Thomsen 1986g.

<9>:Bohm and Hiley 1975: 95.

<10>:Hiley 1980: 80-1.

<11>:Barbour 1966: 300-1.

<12>:Barbour 1966: 299 (see also Barbour 1955: 11); Bohm and Hiley 1982; and Toulmin 1962: 17.

<13>:See Bohm 1987c; and Earman 1986.

<14>:Gudder 1979: 59.

<15>:Marshall 1985: 265-7; Siegel 1963; Temple 1982: 364; and Vigier 1957: 77. Cushing 1991b: 39 suggests Bohm's approach anticipates and agrees with that of modern chaos theory (see also Anon. 1990b). Lindsay 1957: 32 accuses Bohm of identifying causality with determinism. As in its title, Bohm 1957a deals in depth with the questions of causality and chance (see also Bohm and Schützer 1955; and Osborne 1985). For a discussion of causality and science, see Puterman 1977. Marshall 1985: 266 claims "Bohm's theory between 1952 and 1980 has evolved...toward acausality." Dingle 1970 derives a theory of causality for quantum physics that he feels Bohm fathered.

<16>:Some describe Bohm's hidden variables/quantum potential interpretation of quantum physics as being like a sub-quantum dynamic fluid interpretation, and it is often incorporated under stochastic approaches. In this the velocity of a particle has a random component in addition to what it has in his causal theory (even though Zeilinger 1988 criticizes calling Bohm's theory causal, I will follow the custom of doing so). See Bohm and Hiley 1989; 1991; Fine 1989; Petroni 1985: 199; Tarozzi and van der Merwe 1985: Part 2; and Wheeler and Zurek 1983: 779.

<17>:Jeffreys and von Neumann, respectively, quoted in Hanson 1958: 153 and 230; see also ibid., p. 172.

<18>:Toulmin 1962: 9.

<19>:Besides hidden variables and related matters foundational to quantum physics, Bohm has written on several subjects including the many-body problem and plasma physics, the theory of the synchrotron, and the self-oscillations of a charged particle; see Bohm 1959; Bohm and Carmi 1964; Bohm and Foldy 1946; 1947; Bohm and Gross 1948; 1949a; 1949b; 1950; Bohm, Huang and Pines 1957; Bohm and Peat 1987: 4-5; Bohm and Pines 1950; 1951; 1953; Bohm and Weinstein 1948; Bohm, Weinstein and Kouts 1949; Carmi and Bohm 1964; Ford and Bohm 1950; and Pines and Bohm 1952. See also Gross 1987; and Pines 1987. His work on plasma physics is foundational to the subject; see Amini 1985; Aston 1980; Carini 1983; Coakley 1980; Hiley and Peat 1987b: 3; Main 1984; and Parish 1980.

<20>:Briggs and Peat 1984: 95-6; 1987: 70. See also Jammer 1988: 691.

<21>:Bohm 1951: 29 and 623; see also pp. 101, 114-5, 139, and 622-3.

<22>:Folse 1985 provides interesting background on Bohr's own holistic thinking; see especially pp. 48-9. See also Folse 1987; and 1989b.

<23>:Bohm and Hiley 1982: 1014. See also Bernstein 1984/85: 8; Jammer 1974: 219, 279; Temple 1982: 361-2; and comments by Yuval Ne'eman and Abraham Paris in Woolf 1980: 267.

<24>:Belinfante 1973: xvi.

<25>:Bohm 1957a: ix-xi; 1980b: 76; 1988: 14; Bohm and Hiley 1982; 1984: 256, referring to de Broglie 1960; and Jammer 1988: 694. See also de Broglie 1926; 1927a; 1927b; 1928; 1963; 1970; 1987; and Flato, Maric, Milojevic, Sternheimer and Vigier 1976. Madelung could be added to de Broglie's name as giving a precursor to Bohm's theory; see Wesley 1983: 105-8. Jammer 1974: Chap. 7; Kaliski 1970; Rosen 1985; and Wheeler and Zurek 1983: 777-8 survey hidden variables theories including those prior to Bohm's.

<26>:Bohm 1952a; 1952b; 1952c; 1953a; 1953b; 1953c; 1953d; 1962a (as 1980b: 76-110); Bohm, Schiller and Tiomno 1955; Bohm and Vigier 1954; and 1958. See also Blokhintsev 1978: Chap. 14 (reflecting his early 1950s work); Bohm and Hiley 1975: 96-101; Belinfante 1973: Part II, Chap. 2; de Broglie 1960: Part 2; d'Espagnat 1983: 90-1; Epstein 1952; 1953; Fényes 1952; Freistadt 1953: 220-1; 1957; Halpern 1952; Harvey 1966; Jammer 1988: 694; Kershaw 1964 (note Nelson 1966); Régnier, Schatzman and Vigier 1952; Rosenfeld 1953: 403-4; Schatzman 1952; Steiger 1954; Takabayasi 1952; 1953; 1984; Vigier 1952; Weizel 1953a; 1953b; and 1954. With regard to de Broglie and his objectors, see Bohm 1952b; Bohm 1953b: 283; Bohm and Hiley 1982: 1003, 1014; Bohm and Vigier 1954; de Broglie 1960: Chap. 14; 1963: 131-3; Dewdney and Hiley 1982: 28; and Jammer 1974: 111-4.

<27>:Jammer 1988: 692.

<28>:Keller 1953; and Pauli 1953 are two publications posing important difficulties to which Bohm and Vigier 1954 reply. Halpern 1952 is replied to in Bohm 1952c (see also Belinfante 1973: 118-21; and Jammer 1974: 278-96 - but with regard to this last reference, see also Temple 1982: 364). Takabayasi 1952 and 1953 are replied to in Bohm 1953b. For a list of criticisms, also see Rosenfeld 1957; 1958 (but see also de Broglie and Rosenfeld 1958). See also Finkelstein 1987: 289.

<29>:Bohm 1957b: 33.

<30>:Bohm 1953b: 280-1.

<31>:Davies and Brown 1986: 133-4.

<32>:In his initial exposition on hidden variables Bohm writes that, while the usual interpretation of quantum theory is consistent, it is based on an experimentally untestable assumption related to the one Heisenberg had made. This tenet is that the most complete specification possible for a system is in terms of a wave function that, because of its mathematical definition, can only determine the probable result of an actual measurement. He considers there is only one way to investigate the truth of this assumption, and that is to use an alternative interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of variables that are at present hidden. See Bohm 1952a: 166. For an elaboration on the notion of probability used here, see Vigier 1957.

<33>:Bohm 1953c: 458. See also Bohm 1980b: 65; and Bohm and Vigier 1954.

<34>:Bohm 1952a: 166; 1957b: 33, 35-7; see also Bohm 1980b: 78.

<35>:Bohm 1952a: 166.

<36>:See Belinfante 1973: 94; and Bell 1982.

<37>:Aharonov and Albert 1987: 224; Bohm 1953b: 279; and Jammer 1988: 694.

<38>:Bohm 1952c; and Bohm and Vigier 1954: 215.

<39>:Bohm and Bub 1966a: 462; see also their 1966b; 1968; Bohm 1969a: 443-6; 1971c: 102-16; 1980b: 80-110; Belinfante 1973: Part II, Chap. 4; Bub 1968; 1973: 51; and Jammer 1974: 312-8. Cerofolini considers the Bohm-Bub hidden variables theory to be formally equivalent to his sub-quantum physics; see Cerofolini 1982; and 1988.

<40>:Dewdney and Hiley 1982: 47; Landergott 1973; and Tutsch 1968: 232. See also Tutsch 1969. For instances of its modification, see Tutsch 1968; and Belinfante 1973. It is interesting to note, as well, that the Birkbeck School consider the Bohm-Bub theory to be an extension or modification or restatement of the original Bohm version, whereas many commentators treat them as two different, though related, theories; see Bohm and Hiley 1975: 97; and Jammer 1988: 695.

<41>:Longtin and Mattuck 1984: 685-6.

<42>:Actually, it is a quantum mechanical state vector that collapses into an eigenstate.

<43>:Bohm and Bub 1966a: 453. But see Christensen and Mattuck 1982.

<44>:Bohm and Bub 1966a: 466; see also Bohm 1980b: 82-5, 105-9. Papaliolios 1967.

<45>:Bohm 1969a: 446. See also Papaliolios 1967: 624; Tutsch 1968: 232; and 1969: 1116.

<46>:Freedman, Holt and Papaliolios 1976: 47. See also Belinfante 1973: xvi, 163 and Part II Chap. 5.

<47>:Bohm and Bub 1966a: 467; Bohm 1988: 112; Belinfante 1973: 162. See also Bell 1987b.

<48>:Hanson 1958: 173. See also his 1963: Chap. 6; and Jammer 1988: 694. Bohm showed Pauli's criticisms were wrong.

<49>:Quoted in Jammer 1988: 694.

<50>:Von Neumann 1955: x, 209-11, 323-8; Bohm 1971c: 97-102; Bohm 1980b: 70-1; Bohm and Bub 1966a: 460-2. See also Capasso, Fortunato, and Selleri 1970; and Clauser and Wigner 1971. A summary of von Neumann's ideas can be found in Bell 1966 (regading Bell, Bohm, and von Neumann, see also Crease and Mann 1988: 88-90); and in Jammer 1974: 265-78. See Jauch and Piron 1963: 827-9 for a history of the question and of von Neumann's results. Popper 1982: 11-4 provides further historical background. Albertson 1961; and Zinnes 1958 restate von Neumann's proof in other forms.

<51>:Belinfante 1973: Part I and 162; Jammer 1974: 296-302, 312-39. For other difficulties it faces, see Tutsch 1969: 1116ff; and Teller 1977.

<52>:Jauch and Piron 1968: 228. See also Jauch 1968: Chap. 7; 1976; and Jauch and Piron 1963, which is based on a formulation of quantum physics by Piron published in 1964. Piron 1972 simplifies Gleason's 1957 theory.

<53>:Gudder 1968a: 231; see also Greechie and Gudder 1973; Gudder 1968b; 1979: 60-1; and 1983: 114-6.

<54>:Bell 1966 tries to prove that the arguments of von Neumann, of Jauch and Piron, and of Gleason, make unreasonable assumptions. He is also critical of the attempts by Bohm up to a 1962 publication to undermine von Neumann's theorem (see also Bell 1987). See, for instance, Bohm 1952b.

<55>:Tutsch 1968: 232. See also Bohm and Bub 1968; Hübner 1983: 80-1; Jauch and Piron 1968; and Turner 1968. For instance, Bohm and Bub think Jauch and Piron's argument is circular. For Jauch and Piron to conclude hidden variables cannot exist requires an assumption. This assumption is equivalent to their conclusion that current quantum physics is the only theory that correctly describes experimental results. See Bohm and Bub 1966b: 470. Bub 1974b surveys this whole question; see also Bub 1976; 1977; and MacKinnon 1981. Bub still finds the relationship between these various proofs and hidden variables theories obscure, even after what he calls Bell's excellent analysis. See Bub 1969: 101.

<56>:Misra 1967: 841-3. Bohm 1957a states this criticism thoroughly.

<57>:The reasons Misra raises against the hidden variables theories of Bohm, and Bohm and Bub do not seem convincing; they could be just as strong in motivating a person to improve those theories.

<58>:Rédei 1986 attempts to strenthen Misra's case. Gudder's later approaches are similar to Misra's. He shows the proofs of von Neumann and his successors do rule out some hidden variables theories. He thinks, however, that a type of hidden variables theory is possible for quantum physics. He thinks this even though these theories do not seem any simpler or better to him and people rarely use them. Examples he gives are the theories of Bohm and Bub, Einstein, and his own. See Gudder 1979: 59-65; see also Gudder 1970: 431-2: a hidden variables "theory is always possible" in quantum physics in its present framework. Ochs 1972 challenges Gudder; the latter replies in his 1972. He may have more recently changed his mind about the desirability of using hidden variables; see Gudder and Armstrong 1985. Jordan and Sudarshan 1991 show that quantum mechanics allows no hidden variables at all.

<59>:Bub 1969: 101-2 (he reiterates the same ideas in a book - 1974b; see also his 1981 - a few years later); Kochen and Specker 1965; 1967; and Specker 1975. See also Bub 1968; Demopoulos 1977; Latzer 1974; and Smith 1977: 345.

<60>:Bub 1969: 102.

<61>:Tutsch 1969: 1116.

<62>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 259; and Bohm 1969a: 446. See also ibid., pp. 446-7; and Bohm and Bub 1966a: 466.

<63>:Popper 1985: 15-6.

<64>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 259. See also de Muynck 1987.

<65>:Quigg 1985: 84.

<66>:Hawking 1985: 146-7.

<67>:Hiley relates in his 1971: 181 that his motivation for attempting to go beyond quantum theory springs mainly from the problems arising at very high energies. He believes the root of the difficulties is in the quantum description. At the low energy domain there is no reason to question its validity. He goes on to show how the holomovement theory now promoted by the School may solve the problems raised (ibid., pp. 188-9).

<68>:Philippidis, Dewdney and Hiley 1979: 17. See also Temple 1982: 362.

<69>:Jammer 1988: 693 describes this well. Honig 1988 interprets the quantum potential with his "fluid droplet electron model." Compare also with Kyprianidis's use of the Hamilton-Jacobi theory.

<70>:See, for instance, Philippidis, Bohm and Kaye 1982. Bohm, Hiley and Kaloyerou 1987: 323-48 discuss the quantum potential theory in detail, in particular showing how it produces the differences between the classical and the quantum theories (see also Bohm 1988b).

<71>:Bohm and Hiley 1976b: 176-7; Davies and Brown 1986: 39; and Jammer 1988: 696. See also Bohm and Hiley 1975: 97-9; 1982: 1005-6; 1984: 259-62; Bohm, Dewdney and Hiley 1985: 296; and Philippidis, Dewdney and Hiley 1979: 27.

<72>:Philippidis, Dewdney and Hiley 1979: 25; but their result has been criticized as not fitting the double slit flux that is actually observed - see Wesley 1983: 107. See also Hiley 1985: 239-42. Dewdney 1987; 1988c; and 1988d describe how the Birkbeck interpretation accounts for two-particle, nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. Another paper uses the quantum potential approach to describe "one-dimensional time-dependent scattering of wave packets from square barriers and square wells"; Dewdney and Hiley 1982: 27 - see also Dewdney 1985; 1988a; Dewdney and Holland 1988; Hiley 1985: 245-8; and Lam and Dewdney 1990. See also Bell 1987b; and Holland 1982.

<73>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 260.

<74>:Bohm and Hiley 1980: 267-9 also distinguish between active information and inactive information. They thus move to the solution of the measurement problem that the following section discusses. See also Davies and Brown 1986: 128; and Horodecki 1988.

<75>:Bohm and Hiley 1985; Halpern 1986; and Thomsen 1986f: 27. Quantum theory is now finding several other applications at the macroscopic level; see, for example, Clark 1987; Leggett 1984; and 1988.

<76>:Bohm, Dewdney and Hiley 1985: 297; but see Umakantha, Bohm, Dewdney and Hiley 1986. Davies and Brown 1986: 38-9 suggest that the quantum potential approach could mean signals travel backwards in time, thus creating a causal paradox. Bohm ibid., pp. 125-6 does not agree; neither does Hiley (ibid., pp. 141-2).

<77>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 256; see also ibid., p. 260; and Bohm 1984: 781 (in which he refers to Bohm and Hiley 1982: 1001).

<78>:Bohm and Hiley 1976b: 175.

<79>:Bohm, Dewdney and Hiley 1985: 297. See also Philippidis, Bohm and Kaye 1982: 80.

<80>:Bopp, quoted in Philippidis, Dewdney and Hiley 1979: 18. Bopp also says Bohm's theory is not "physics but metaphysics"; Körner 1957: 51.

<81>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 257. Concerning the measurement problem, see, for instance, Rae 1986; Smolin 1985: 40-1; and Wigner 1963.

<82>:Bohm and Bub 1966a: 457. See also Bell 1966: 448, n. 8; and Bub 1969: 121-2.

<83>:Dewdney and Hiley 1982: 46-7. Bohm 1969a: 439-43 describes how this assumption of the completeness of the reigning quantum theory leads to the measurement problem. There are many publications assessing the inadequacies of the Copenhagen interpretation and suggesting the need for another one; see, for example, Hodgson 1989; and Stuart 1991.

<84>:Some even say consciousness is a hidden variable. See, for example, Ballentine et al. 1971: 39; Bohm and Hiley 1976b; d'Espagnat 1969; Gardner 1982; Gribbin 1984: 205-13; Smolin 1985: 42-3; Snyder 1989; Talbot 1981: Chap. 1; Toben, Sarfatti and Wolf 1975: 11, 134; Trigg 1980: 154-60; Walker 1974; Wassermann 1983; Wheeler 1977b; and Wigner 1962; 1963; 1969a; 1969b; 1970b; 1970c; 1972; 1973. However, also see Bohm and Hiley 1976b: 173; Bohm, Dewdney and Hiley 1985: 294; and Rae 1986: 63-74. Von Neumann would say the change of state of a physical system being observed is completed only when the observer's consciousness registers the result of the observation. For critiques of von Neumann's and of Bohr's (inseparability of observer and observed) approaches, see Shimony 1963. Cramer's 1986 interpretation of quantum mechanics is similar to Wigner's; see Thomsen 1987.

<85>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 257. Shimony 1963: 772-3, n. 33 is a brief assessment of Everett's "many worlds" solution; see also Ballentine et al. 1971; Bohm, Hiley and Kaloyerou 1987: 346-7; DeWitt 1968; 1970; 1971; Everett 1957; Wheeler 1957; other papers in DeWitt and Graham 1973; and, for a popular account, Gribbin 1984: Chap. 11. Bell 1981 interestingly likens the Everett theory with that of Bohm (and de Broglie). See also Wilber 1982b: 172-9. Squires 1987 suggests a related view to Everett's, the "many views of one world" interpretation (see also Anon. 1987b).

<86>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 257. See also ibid., pp. 268-9; Bohm 1969a: 444; Bohm and Hiley 1984; and Dewdney, Garuccio, Guéret, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1985. Zeh 1988 criticizes both the Birkbeck and Everett's solutions to the measurement problem. Thomsen 1986d describes recent developments about the measurement problem.

<87>:Bohm 1952a: 167; 1957a: Chap. 3; 1969a: 439; 1980b: 65-76; but see Stapp 1972; and 1985c. See also Trigg 1980: 156.

<88>:One can also talk of the random thermal motions of the particles comprising the apparatus significantly affecting the particle being observed, but that cannot be controlled or predicted exactly.

<89>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 256-7; Bohm 1980b: 88-105; and Hiley 1985: 249-54. There is a discrepancy between the early and the later Heisenberg with regard to this; see Temple 1982: 364.

<90>:Bohm 1957b: 33-7; and Bohm 1952b.

<91>:Bohm 1969a: 439-43; and Dewdney and Hiley 1982: 46-7. Related to the above discussion, see Hübner 1983: Chap. 2 for a critique of both Bohm's and the Copenhagen approaches to the question of causality; Fröhlich 1987; and Rosen 1987.

<92>:Toulmin 1962: 17-9.

<93>:Bohm 1953b: 283-5.

<94>:Cranston 1974 develops Bohm's idea of causality further. The nonlocality results of the EPR experiments described in later chapters beg the question of causality; see Skyrms 1985.

<95>:Bohm 1969a: 439-43.

<96>:Bohm 1969a: 439-43.

<97>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 256.

<98>:Belinfante 1973: 164; but see Bohm 1971c: 112-3; Bohm and Bub 1966a: 466; and Fox and Rosner 1971. See also Audi 1973: 97; Putnam 1965: 87; Körner 1957: 46-89; and the interesting comments in Feyerabend 1960: 326, n. 1. The same statement is made much later in Bohm and Hiley 1984: 255.

<99>:Quoted in Feyerabend 1960: 330, n. 1. See also de Broglie and Rosenfeld 1958; and Rosenfeld 1953: 403-4.

<100>:Peres 1978: 745.

<101>:Popper 1982: 174-5.

<102>:Finkelstein 1987: 292-3.

<103>:Hanson 1962: 91-3. See also Anon. 1966; and Hanson's criticism in his 1963: Chaps 5 and 6.

<104>:This is a different mood about Bohm's work for Hanson than the one he expressed in the conclusion to his famous 1958 publication (pp. 174-5): "At this stage it would be venturesome to try finally to settle this matter; nonetheless...its conceptual significance will be missed by anyone who fails to see how much was at work when physicists of the past disagreed, and missed also by anyone who thinks of the history of physics as just a march of better observations and more accurate experiments." See also Heisenberg 1955: 17-9; and 1958: 130-3, where he argues that Bohm's hidden variables proposal says nothing about physics that is different from what the Copenhagen interpretation says. He then goes on to argue against choosing Bohm's language as being more suitable than the Copenhagen side because it is not an improvement. Bohm replies in his 1962c.

<105>:Polkinghorne 1988: 339; see also Polkinghorne 1984: 57; 1986: 10-1; and 1989: 83. Despite what Polkinghorne writes, Bohm's theories do now apply in relativistic situations, as I mention below. Russell 1988: 371, n. 12 similarly questions Polkinghorne's appraisal of Bohm regarding special relativity and his underlying philosophical judgements. See also Cushing 1991a; and 1991b.

<106>:D'Espagnat 1983: 16.

<107>:Jauch 1976: 123.

<108>:Smolin 1985: 43. See also Rosen 1985.

<109>:von Weizsäcker and Görnitz 1991.

<110>:Honig 1987a: xiv.

<111>:Barbour 1966: 299-301; Garstens 1971: 87; and Körner 1957: 51.

<112>:Bohm 1957a. Russell 1983 analyzes Bohm's hidden variables physics as a research program. In this context its philosophical strengths and weaknesses in comparison with those of the Copenhagen school clearly emerge.

<113>:D'Espagnat 1986: 944. See also his 1987d.

<114>:Bohm and Hiley 1984. See also Bell 1987b; Bohm and Hiley 1985b; 1991; Hiley 1989: 11-4; 1989b: 187-8; and Moylan 1982.

<115>:Longtin and Mattuck 1984: 685. Two years previous to this, an article appeared written by Mattuck and Christensen that details the modification of the original Bohm-Bub hidden variables theory through the work of Tutsch and Belinfante, but which still was inadequate because it was not relativistically covariant; Christensen and Mattuck 1982: 348.

<116>:Bohm, Hiley and Kaloyerou 1987: 349-75; Kaloyerou 1985; and Lima Vargas Moniz 1988; see also Bohm 1988: 119-21; Bohm and Hiley 1991; Hiley 1989: 11; and Pitowsky 1991.

<117>:Bohm, Dewdney and Hiley 1985: 294; Hellmuth, Zajonc and Walther 1985; Jonas 1986; Miller and Wheeler 1984; Thomsen 1986h; Umakantha, Bohm, Dewdney and Hiley 1986; and Wheeler 1978. The quantum potential approach also accounts for the results of neutron interferometry experiments (see Dewdney 1988a; and 1988b) and for an anomalous photoelectric effect (see Kyprianidis 1987).

<118>:Tutsch 1968: 234. He elaborates his thoughts further in Tutsch 1969.

<119>:Bohm and Hiley 1989; and 1991: 247-9. See also Anon. 1990; and Götsch, Koch, Lüning, Scheer, and Schmidt 1988. Panarella 1987 claims experimental preference for the effective photon hypothesis approach to quantum theory over that of the quantum potential theory.

<120>:Toulmin 1962: 11, 19-22.

<121>:Temple 1982: 365; see also Maxwell 1988; Peat 1988; Penrose 1989: 280-1; and Rosen 1988. Casti 1989: 491 says that, while his mind is with the quantum potential approach, his heart is not; his is a half-way step.

<122>:There are, of course, other hidden variables theories both before and after Bohm's proposals, and these also continue to foster research interest. See, for example, Accardi 1988; Belinfante 1973; Fine 1974; 1989; Flanagan 1988; Graber 1989; Gudder 1972; 1980; 1984a; 1984b; Gudder and Armstrong 1985: 1009, which refers to some more recent attempts; Hnilo 1991; Honig 1987a; 1987b; Pignedoli 1988: 188-9; Pitowsky 1983; Pollini 1988; Rédei 1985; 1986; Robinson 1985; and Shimony 1986 (Shimony 1984b; and 1989: 387-9, 395 questions Bohm's program; Bohm and Hiley 1984b reply; and Shimony 1989b: 30 furthers the discussion). Vigier 1980 finds new impetus for continuing the development of a version of hidden variables theory akin to, but not the same as (Bohm and Hiley 1984b; Bitsakis 1985: 69) Bohm's (Bohm and Vigier 1954; 1958). See also Andrade e Silva, Selleri and Vigier 1983; Barut, Bozic and Maric 1988; Croca 1987; Cufaro-Petroni 1987; 1988; 1988b; Cufaro-Petroni, Dewdney, Holland, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1984; 1985; 1985b; 1987 (but see Costa de Beauregard 1987); Cufaro-Petroni, Droz-Vincent and Vigier 1981; Cufaro-Petroni, Garuccio, Selleri and Vigier 1980; Cufaro-Petroni, Gueret, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1985; Cufaro-Petroni, Guéret and Vigier 1984a; 1984b; 1988; Cufaro-Petroni, Gueret, Vigier and Kyprianidis 1985a; 1985b; Cufaro-Petroni, Kyprianidis, Maric and Vigier 1984; Cufaro-Petroni, Maric, Zivanovic and Vigier 1980; 1981; Cufaro-Petroni and Vigier 1981; 1982; 1983; 1983b; 1983c; 1984; Dewdney, Garuccio, Guéret, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1985; Dewdney, Garuccio, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1984; 1984b; Dewdney, Guéret, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1984; Dewdney, Holland and Kyprianidis 1986; 1987a; 1987b; Dewdney, Holland, Kyprianidis, Maric and Vigier 1986; Dewdney, Holland, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1985; 1986a; 1986b; 1988; Dewdney, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1984; Dewdney, Kyprianidis, Vigier, Garuccio, Guéret 1984; Garuccio 1985; Garuccio, Kyprianidis, Sardelis and Vigier 1984; Garuccio, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1984; Garuccio, Popper and Vigier 1981; Garuccio, Rapisarda and Vigier 1982; Garuccio and Vigier 1980; Guéret 1985; Guéret, Holland, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1985; Guéret and Vigier 1982a; 1982b; 1982c; 1983; 1984; Halbwachs, Piperno and Vigier 1982; Holland 1987; 1988b; Holland, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1985; Holland, Kyprianidis, Maric and Vigier 1986; Holland and Vigier 1985; 1988; Kamefuchi et al. 1984: 368; Kyprianidis 1985; 1988a; 1988b; Kyprianidis and Sardelis 1984; Kyprianidis, Sardelis and Vigier 1984; Vigier 1982; 1985; 1985b; 1987; 1988; 1988b; 1991; and Vigier, Dewdney, Holland, and Kyprianidis 1987. Wesley 1983; and 1988 develops a causal theory based on the quantum potential and Bohm's early work; see Phipps 1985. See also Ryff 1990.

<123>:Current superstring physical theories share this in common with those of Bohm, that they shy away from considering particles as extensionless points in a co-ordinate frame - the former treat particles as extended objects. See Anthony and Green 1985.

<124>:Bohm 1963b; 1969b; 1971d: 361-2, 367; Briggs and Peat 1984: 106-8; and Hiley 1980: 81. Note also that the word "order" is something Bohm finds he cannot define. He can only intimate its use by providing his use of it in a wide range of contexts.

<125>:Bohm 1971d: 367.

<126>:Bohm 1971d: 368. Bohm 1962b; 1980b: 9-11; 172-8; Bohm 1965; 1966: 253-6; and Bohm and Hiley 1985b provide expositions of Bohm's ideas regarding relativity theory.

<127>:Hiley 1990.

<128>:Bohm 1971d: 372-3. There are three other novel features of quantum theory for Bohm that I will not elaborate in this chapter: the "indivisibility of the quantum of action", the wave-particle duality of matter, and its statistical nature.

<129>:See Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935; and Bohm 1951: 611-23. Smith and Weingard 1987 provide a relativistic formulation of the EPR paradox. For an elucidation of the EPR experiment, see Bohm and Hiley 1982: 1008-9; Gribbin 1984: Chaps 9 and 10; Hooker 1970; Polkinghorne 1984: 70-7; and Redhead 1987. For its history, see Carazza 1988; Fine 1989: 453-6; Selleri 1988b; and Shimony 1988. Breitenberger 1986 questions the appropriateness of the word paradox. Bitsakis 1988 seeks to generalize the EPR understanding of reality.

<130>:This experiment is an effect exhibited by a many-body system, as opposed to a one-body system, in that it requires the system to have more than one component. See Bohm 1952b: 186-7; Bohm 1976c: 4; Bohm and Hiley 1975: 94; 1976b: 176-7; Bohm and Vigier 1954; Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 8; and Hiley 1980: 80.

<131>:Stapp 1977b: 314; see also Bohm 1952b; Bohm and Hiley 1981b: 529-34; Mattuck 1981: 331; Wessels 1985; and Zukav 1979: 304.

<132>:Crease and Mann 1988: 90. Rastall 1985's discussion on the need to reformulate the foundations of quantum physics because the violation of Bell's inequalities implies nonlocality is rebuffed by Stapp 1985d who points out there are two meanings of locality used by Einstein. Rastall is using one while Bell uses the other.

<133>:Bohm and Hiley 1982: 1014-5; and 1980: 51. Bohr's reply to the EPR paper, unacceptable to Einstein, was in essence that the components of the systems separated in the EPR experiment only become defined on measuring one of the systems. Nonlocality arises in situations involving the exchange of a few quanta of energy because it is at that level impossible to separate the observer form the observed. See Bohr 1935; Bohm 1980b: 71-6; Bohm and Hiley 1980: 56-60; 1982: 1009-10; de Muynck 1986; and Stapp 1988c. Like Einstein, Dirac was unhappy with nonlocality. For him it violated the spirit of relativity. But nothing better was available. The problem of reconciling relativity and quantum theory stood unresolved. Heisenberg also appears to have rejected Bohr's point of view; see Bohm 1977.

<134>:Bohm and Hiley 1980; 1989; and Davies and Brown 1986: 143-4. Bohm and Hiley 1988 discuss the implications of the quantum potential approach for relativity.

<135>:Bohm and Aharonov 1957: 1072. See also Philippidis, Bohm and Kaye 1982.

<136>:Barbour 1990: 106-8.

<137>:Jammer 1988: 696.

<138>:Barbour 1990: 106-8. Bohm's first hidden variables theory explained to him how quantum objects that are far apart might connect; see Bohm 1952b: 180.

<139>:Hiley 1977: 411-3. Hiley 1989: 14-6 suggests that locality is not necessary for the description of physical processes. A relational concept of locality would be sufficient. In 1989b: 188-90 he describes the origin of locality in the universe.

<140>:Aharonov and Bohm 1959; 1961a; 1961b; 1962; 1963; Aharonov, Pendleton and Petersen 1969; Bohm 1951; 1963; Bohm and Aharonov 1957; 1960; Bohm and Hiley 1979; Bohm and Philippidis 1971; and Hiley 1985: 242-5. See also Aharonov and Bohm 1957; 1964; Bastin 1971: 91-4; 129-35; Fock 1962; 1966; Freedman, Holt and Papaliolios 1976: 48; Jammer 1974: 148-50; 333; Kasday 1971; Selleri 1988b: 16-8; Smith 1977: 342; Tonomura 1990: 25; and Vardi 1980).

<141>:Philippidis, Bohm and Kaye 1982: 75; and Semon 1982: 49.

<142>:Bohm and Hiley 1979: 308. Philippidis, Bohm and Kaye 1982: 86-8 bring out the nonlocality inherent in the AB effect, in contrast to the locality implied in the classical approach. In the course of describing the effect, Feynman, Leighton and Sands 1964: 15.12 also remark on the surprise it has stirred because of its discrepancy as a quantum phenomenon with classical physics.

<143>:For example, see Anon. 1985: 82-3; Aharonov 1984; Albert, Aharonov and D'Amato 1985; Arovas 1986; Bandyopadhyay 1985; Carini, Muttalib and Nagel 1984; Chiao and Yong-Shi 1986; Danos 1982; Erlichson 1970 (a review of the subject); Gauthier 1987; Gordon and Danos 1982; Greenberger 1991; Harris and Semon 1980; Henneberger 1984; Holland and Philippidis 1987; Home and Sengupta 1983 (including all the publications referred to in it; Burnel and Reekmans 1985; and Home 1985 comment and respond to it); Horvathy and Kollar 1984; Huguenin 1981; Kamefuchi et al. 1984: 367-8; Liang 1984; Matteucci and Pozzi 1987; Nambu 1984; Philippidis, Bohm and Kaye 1982 (this paper attempts to answer many criticisms and approaches to the AB effect by posing it in terms of the quantum potential; it also includes a wealth of references to publications on the subject); Schroer 1982; Semon and Taylor 1988; Sukumar 1984; Takabayasi 1983; Wesley 1983: 119-200; and Wu and Yang 1975.

<144>:Anon. 1986; Briggs and Peat 1987: 70; Harris and Semon 1980; Herbert 1987; Imry and Webb 1989; Johnstone 1986; MacCallum 1986; Peterson 1989; Schwarzschild 1986; Semon 1982; Shimony 1988: 43; Thomsen 1986a; Tonomura 1990; Tonomura et al. 1984; 1986; 1990; and Wilczek 1989. However, see Bohm 1963: 112; Bohm and Hiley 1979: 304-5; and Peres and Singer 1960.

<145>:Bohm and Aharonov 1957: 1072 (see also Smith 1977: 343). See Bell 1964; 1966: 452; 1971; 1981b; 1987; Crease and Mann 1988: 90; and Cushing 1989. Bell and Nauenberg 1966 adds further to the flavour of Bell's inclinations. Also see Ballentine 1987; Bertlmann 1990; Brown and Svetlichny 1990; Braunstein and Caves 1988 (Maddox 1988); 1989; Bub 1974b: Chap. VI; Clark and Turner 1968; Clifton, Redhead and Butterfield 1991; Costa de Beauregard 1984; Datta, Home and Raychaudhuri 1987; Demopoulos 1980; Elby 1990; Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger 1989; Gudder 1984b; Hiley 1977: 412-3; Hooker 1989; Howard 1989; Jammer 1974: 302-11; Jones 1989; Krips 1989; Lochak 1977; McGoveran, Noyes and Manthey 1989; Mermin 1981; 1981b; 1989; 1990; Miziumski 1989; Pagels 1983: 137-52; Peat 1989; Peres 1978; 1989; Piccioni, Mehlhop and Wright 1989; Piron 1983; Pitowsky 1989; Popper 1971; and 1982 (but see Sudbery 1985); Pykacz 1988; Rédei 1989; Roussel 1986; Selleri 1985; Shimony 1990a; Vogt 1989; Werbos 1989; Wessels 1985; Wheeler and Zurek 1983: 775; and Wigner 1970b. The question was also refined by Stapp and Wigner; see Ballentine 1987: 786; Bohm and Hiley 1980: 53; Cushing 1989; Hiley 1976: 610; Stapp 1977a; 1982b; 1985b (but also see Dotson 1987; Fellows 1988; Guy and Deltete 1988; Stapp 1987; 1988a; and 1988b); 1991; Suppes and Zanotti 1976; 1980; and Wigner 1970a.

<146>:Folse 1981: 261. Bell derived the inequality in the context of hidden variables, but it holds for any theory based on local correlations established when the systems separate initially; Hiley 1977: 413. Bohm and Hiley 1976a explain the development of this type of experiment with regard to ruling out such things as the possibility of signals being sent at or less than the speed of light or of a spontaneous localization process; see also Baracca, Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1975; Brody and de la Pena Auerbach 1979; and Flato 1976. Criticism and development continues on the Bell inequality; see, for example, Angelidis 1985; Bitsakis 1985; Jarrett 1989; Notarrigo 1988 (but see Pascazio 1988); 1988b; Piccioni, Bowles, Enscoe, Garland and Mehlhop 1985; Scalera 1988; Selleri 1985b; and Selleri and Zeilinger 1988. Peres 1986 interestingly discusses the assumption of free will in Bell's inequality.

<147>:One must remember that the two events or particles that exhibit nonlocality in the EPR experiment have a common origin. They are not just two random events. On the other hand, one could also argue that all events or particles have a common origin in the big bang creation of the universe. Wessels 1989 clearly outlines the assumptions made in deriving the Bell inequality, at least one of which needs giving up with its failure.

<148>:D'Espagnat 1979 (see also Weisskopf and d'Espagnat 1980); Herbert 1985b; Hiley 1980b; 1983; Mermin 1985 (but see Aspect et al. 1985); Piccioni and Mehlhop 1986; Robinson 1982; 1983; Rohrlich 1983 (see also Mermin and Rohrlich 1984); Selleri 1988a; Smolin 1985: 41; and Wolf 1981: Chaps 11 and 12 present good popular accounts of the story of the EPR experiment and interpretations of its results. Aspect, Dalibard and Roger 1982 represents a climax of this experimental carrying out of the EPR thought-experiment; it contains references to previous attempts as well. See also Anon. 1981b; Anon. 1982; Anon. 1987a; Aspect and Grangier 1984; 1985; 1990; Aspect, Grangier and Roger 1982; Bohm and Hiley 1976a; Bohm and Hiley 1980: 51-3; Clauser and Horne 1974; Clauser and Shimony 1978; Duch 1988 (but see Zukowski and Pykacz 1988); Fox and Rosner 1971; Freedman 1990; Freedman and Clauser 1972; Freedman, Holt and Papaliolios 1976; Fry 1984; Garuccio 1988; Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1980; Hiley 1977: 413; 1983; Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger 1989; 1990; Horne and Zeilinger 1985; Kraus 1985b; Lamehi-Rachti and Mittig 1977; Lo and Shimony 1981; Mandel 1985; Marshall 1980a; Marshall, Santos and Selleri 1985; Mermin 1981; 1981b (Stedman 1985 reports constructing Mermin's device); 1990; Paul 1985; Rauch 1985; Russell 1985; Santos 1985; 1987; Selleri 1988d; Shimony 1971; 1978; 1984; 1986; Six 1985; Sudbery 1988b; Thomsen 1986b; 1986c; Tixier, et al. 1988; von Baeyer 1991; Webb 1988; Zukav 1979: 298-331; and references in Ballentine 1987; and Buonomano 1978 (which proposes another type of experiment designed to differentiate between a class of local hidden variables theories and quantum physics); those in Hiley 1977; Paty 1977; Peres 1978; in Pipkin 1978; and in Wheeler and Zurek 1983: 776-7.

<149>:Bohm and Hiley 1975: 94, 101, 105; 1976b: 178; 1979; and Fano 1988.

<150>:Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 8.

<151>:Clauser and Shimony 1978: 1881; see also Davies 1984: Chap. 3; and van Fraassen 1989.

<152>:Hodgson 1984: 409.

<153>:See Selleri 1988a; and 1988b: 47-60.

<154>:For example, see Åberg 1985; Bohm and Hiley 1984: 260-2; 1988; Dewdney 1988c; Dewdney and Holland 1988; Selleri 1988b: 47-9; Shallis 1984; and Thomsen 1986c. Within a discussion of the EPR experiment, de Muynck 1986: 997-8 suggestively says the nonlocality of Bohm's quantum potential does not imply a nonlocal interaction between distant particles. Wan 1988, using Bohm's quantum potential ideas, derives a formulation of quantum physics in which there is nonlocality at small distances but where events are separable (locality) at large distances; see also Timson and Wan 1988.

<155>:Vigier 1980: 467. He and his colleagues so develop their theory and its interpretation of the Aspect experiment; see, for example, Barut, Bozic and Maric 1988; Cufaro-Petroni and Vigier 1982; 1983; Dewdney, Holland, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1988; Garuccio, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1984; and Halbwachs, Piperno and Vigier 1982. Other hidden variables theories also reproduce the EPR results of the Aspect experiments; see, for example, Seipp 1986; and Selleri and Zeilinger 1988.

<156>:Mattuck 1981: 331. See also, for his realist approach to hidden variables, D'Espagnat 1969; 1973; 1975; 1976; 1978; 1979; 1981; 1983: 89-92; 1987b; Herbert 1985; and 1985b: 48-50.

<157>:Mattuck 1981: 331. Jauch 1973: 22; and 1976: 123 makes a similar point.

<158>:Lévy-Leblond 1977: 188.

<159>:See Bohm and Hiley 1989: 97. Ballentine and Jarrett 1987 suggest there are two types of locality involved: a strong form for the EPR experiment as conceived using Bell's theorem - see below - and a weaker form satisfied by relativity and quantum mechanics. See also Ballentine 1987: 786-7; Butterfield 1989; and Fine 1989.

<160>:It also bypasses such objections as, in the tradition of von Neumann, those of Kochen and Specker. See Pitowsky 1982; 1982b; 1983: 2317; 1982c; 1985; and 1989b: 180-1, Chap. 5. See also Ballentine 1987: 790; Ghirardi 1988; Gudder 1984b; Macdonald 1982; and Mermin 1982. Dotson 1986 and Kraus 1985 draw other Copenhagen-oriented interpretations.

<161>:Fine 1989b; McMullin 1989; Stapp 1989; and Teller 1989. See also Hughes 1989.

<162>:Helliwell and Konkowski 1983: 1000; see also Costa de Beauregard 1983.

<163>:Gribbin 1984: 228-9. Aspect disavows that his EPR experiments establish the possibility of communication faster-than-light; Aspect, Dalibard and Roger 1982: 1805, 1807. Faster-than-light communication can mean moving information backwards in time; Selleri and Vigier 1980 rebuff this for the EPR situation, but Stapp 1988e uses only orthodox quantum thinking to describe a situation which violates Einstein's locality idea that no causal influence can act outside the forward light cone. Popper sees the EPR experiments as confirming action-at-a-distance in the sense of going against Einstein's special relativity. It does not shake or even touch realism (Bohm's program is, of course, a realist view; see Bohm 1988b), nor does it cause him to abandon locality. See Popper 1982: xviii, 23, 25; and 1985: 19 (see also Angelidis and Popper 1985; Brown 1988; d'Espagnat 1987; 1987c; Fine 1986; Gamba 1987; Garg 1983; Polkinghorne 1984: 74-82; Rayski 1984; Redhead 1987; and Selleri 1988c). Trigg 1980: 165-82 upholds realism in the face of the seeming subjectiveness of such quantum phenomena as the EPR experiment. Heywood and Redhead 1983 raise further doubts about the reconcilability of realism and locality in quantum physics beyond those derived from Bell's inequality. In terms of action-at-a-distance, one could compare nonlocal correlations with the problem of inertia. There is a brief discussion of this comparison in Gribbin 1984: 230-1. Gribbin continues, pp. 231-4, by disclosing further experiments to test the existence of nonlocality and also developments in computer technology that make use of connectedness at the quantum level. Nonlocality shows up in other subjects of physics; the Aharonov-Bohm effect, mentioned above, is an obvious example. Among others, Bub 1985 and Ne'eman 1985 point to gauge theories.

<164>:Hiley 1977: 413.

<165>:Sarfatti 1987; and Zukav 1979: 310-4; see also Herbert 1988. Stapp apparently raises a similar idea; see Zukav 1979: 311-2. However, see Bohm and Hiley 1976b (compare with their 1989); Breitenberger 1986: 116; Jones and Clifton 1991; and Stapp 1988d.

<166>:Anon 1986b: 12; Jonas 1986: 11; Redhead 1989; Shimony 1988: 40-1; 1990b; and Wlodzislaw and Aerts 1986.

<167>:Several other interpretations of the EPR experiment not mentioned above are described in Zukav 1979: 314-21. See also Aerts 1985; Balentine 1987; Costa de Beauregard 1988; Cramer 1986; Crease and Mann 1988: 92; Folse 1989; Griffiths 1986; Healey 1991; Mayants 1988; Prosser 1985; Rietdijk 1985; van Fraassen 1985; and von Weizäcker 1985.

<168>:For an indication of this, see the various papers in Tarozzi and van der Merwe 1985.

<169>:Bohm and Hiley 1976b: 178. If it appears this contradicts what Bohm and Hiley usually assert, one should note that their school of thought also insists the reality of undivided wholeness can often be adequately approximated by the classical approach of locality.

<170>:Wheeler 1974: 689-91; see also Helitzer 1973; Wheeler 1973; 1977a; and 1980. The connection between this stance and his and Wigner's solution to the measurement problem, as mentioned above, is apparent. Wheeler's 1974 and 1977a papers draw a connection between the quantum principle and the anthropic principle of physical cosmology; see Sharpe 1985; and Smith 1990.

<171>:Hiley 1980: 81.

<172>:Hiley 1980: 80.

<173>:See, for example, Bohm 1969a: 440-1. Also see Hiley 1988.

<174>:Teller 1989 suggests that to understand the EPR correlations we need to accept relational holism. The problems coming from the correlations are due to our instinctively thinking the particles are independent. To start our thinking with relational holism removes the problems. This is very much like what Bohm advocates regarding Bohr.

<175>:Bohm 1971b: 38-9; 1971c: 95-7; Bohm and Hiley 1975: 103-4; 1976b: 175-8; Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 174; and Hiley 1971: 182-3.

<176>:Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 175; and Jammer 1988: 697.

<177>:Bohm 1974a - this reference details the changes to some length - for instance, pp. 171-2, 174-5. See also Bohm 1974b; Bub 1974a; Causey 1974; Philippidis, Bohm and Kaye 1982: 76; Suppe 1974b: 180-191, 409-19; and 1977b.

<178>:Bohm and Hiley 1975: 94-5.

<179>:Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 175. See also Bastin 1971b: 92, 129-34; 1969; and Bohm 1971a. The idea of order is important here.

<180>:Bohm 1971b: 40. Ford and Peat 1988 follow Bohm's lead by saying language plays an active role in the development of scientific thinking.

<181>:Bohm 1971d: 376-7.

<182>:Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 8; and Hiley 1971: 185. Lestienne 1977 raises four points of Bohm that he thinks are capable of opening the debate on the relationship between relativity and quantum physics. See also his 1973.

<183>:Bohm 1971c: 97; 1971d: 369-72; Bohm and Hiley 1980: 48-51; Bub 1974a; Jammer 1974: 156; and Lestienne 1977.

<184>:Bohm 1971d: 378-9; see also Bohm and Hiley 1975: 106-8; 1980 - in this article, on pp. 54-6, the authors present nonlocality along Einsteinian lines - and 1985b.

<185>:Bohm 1971d: 379.

<186>:Bohm 1971d: 372-3. See also Bohm 1965-66; and Bohm and Hiley 1981b.

<187>:See Sharpe 1984b; or below. Shimony 1981: 435 senses something similar.

<188>:On the other hand, see Briggs and Peat 1984: 78.

<189>:Penrose 1972. For further problems, see Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 13. See also Bohm 1966: 252-3.

<190>:Brill 1972; Chew and Stapp 1988; Hiley 1980: 76; and Klauder 1972. For Wheeler's work see, for example, his 1962; 1964; 1968; 1973; 1973b; 1974: 688-91; 1980b; Misner, Thorne and Wheeler 1973: Chap. 44, pp. 1196-216; and Wheeler and Patton 1977.

<191>:Bohm and Hiley 1982: 1013; Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 13; and Hiley 1980: 76.

<192>:Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 7. See also Bohm and Hiley 1975: 96; Bohm 1980a; 1978a; Sharpe 1984b (part of which reappears below); and Weber 1986: Chap. 2. With regard to the relativity-quantum mechanical reconciliation within this new wholeness approach, see, for example, Bohm and Hiley 1975: 106-8.

<193>:Bohm and Hiley 1975: 101-6. See also Bohm 1963b; and Davies 1984: 219-21. Bohm talks about super-implicate orders in a similar way; see Bohm and Weber 1983: 40.

<194>:Bohm and Hiley 1975: 105. Peters 1985 critiques Bohm's idea of the whole.

<195>:Bohm 1980b: 178. See also Hiley 1989: 16-7.

<196>:Bohm 1973: 144-5; Bohm 1978b: 90-1; Briggs and Peat 1984: 109-12; and Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 9. Bohm 1971d is one reference that discusses the mathematics of the hologram. Another model often cited as a description of the holomovement or implicate order is that of droplets of dye dropped onto glycerol and folded into it by stirring; see, for example, Bohm 1978a: 39; 1978b: 91-2; Briggs and Peat 1984: 112-5; Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 10-1; and Temple 1982: 365.

<197>:Bohm 1978b: 91.

<198>:Hiley 1980: 94.

<199>:See, however, McVittie 1965: 415. Some of the most advanced developments in physics closely resemble this primitive perception of change; for instance, relativity theory can build an object from unchanging movements.

<200>:Bohm 1976b; 1980b: Chap. 2 (Bohm calls his new language rheomode); Bohm 1988: 117; Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 175-6; Bolotta 1984; Briggs and Peat 1984: 134-5; and Buckley and Peat 1979: 128-9; 146. See also Mary Daly 1973 on the change of language and grammar that the feminist perspective would encourage. Sontag 1983: 75 adds something too.

<201>:Hiley 1980: 78, 94.

<202>:The hologram provides insight into the idea of undivided wholeness just as a lens did in classical physics for the nature of the world. See Bohm 1973: 143-6; 1978a: 38; and 1978b: 90. In the development of medicine and in the development of science in general, machines often provide models, constraints and inspiration for theory; see Gregory 1981. Shimony 1981: 435 points out that classical physics explains holography. Thus, the hologram is only an illustrative metaphor.

<203>:Bohm 1978a: 39; Hiley 1980: 94.

<204>:Bohm 1980b: 177. See also Bohm 1978b: 94-5; 1986f: 131-2, 137-42; and Bohm and Weber 1978: 45-7 for a discussion on time.

<205>:Bohm 1973: 149; 1978a: 40; and 1978b: 93.

<206>:Jammer 1988: 698; Leggett 1984; and 1987.

<207>:Bohm 1973: 146-7; and 1978b: 91.

<208>:In Bohm's later writing, he introduces various implicate orders, such as the superimplicate order that has to do with the quantum theory of fields (Davies and Brown 1986: 128-9, 141-2). Since the nature of each is essentially the same as how I interpret the implicate order, I will write only of that.

<209>:Bohm uses the verb to relevate. Shimony 1981: 435 perceptively suggests Bohm uses the interplay between the implicate and explicate orders to solve the problem of how undivided totality can exhibit itself in well articulated parts and aspects. Chew 1987 suggests "gentle quantum events" as the source of the explicate order.

<210>:Bohm 1978a: 40. See also Bohm 1978b: 94.

<211>:Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 11-2.

<212>:Bohm 1973: 149-54; 1978a: 40; 1978b: 93; and Bohm and Hiley 1975: 99. Restivo 1980; and Restivo and Zenzen 1981 use Bohm's concept of holonomy as the basis for a general metaphysics; see also Rosen 1982.

<213>:Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 176.

<214>:There are other physical ideas explicable by the holomovement concept, but I discuss these three because they were important in previous chapters. Bohm, Hiley and Kaloyerou 1987: 323-48 discuss in detail the metaphysical background and consequences of the quantum potential approach; see also Bohm 1987b; and 1988b.

<215>:Bohm and Hiley 1975: 95; and Dewdney and Hiley 1982: 48. The quantum potential also implies that space cannot be considered a "neutral back cloth" in the quantum domain, because it restricts the processes embedded in it. "More surprisingly still," explain Philippidis, Dewdney and Hiley, the structure of space "arises out of the very objects on which it acts." Even the minutest change in any one of the properties of the objects may result in dramatic changes in the quantum potential. See Philippidis, Dewdney and Hiley 1979: 27-8.

<216>:Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 10-1; and Frescura and Hiley 1980b: 705. See also Bohm and Hiley 1975: 96-101; and 1976a for re-examinations of this "novel potential" raised earlier by Bohm.

<217>:That reality is continuously creative will be discussed further below. See also Bohm 1987: 676.

<218>:Bohm and Hiley 1984: 271. The authors continue (pp. 272-4) by demonstrating the relativistic covariance within their theory, but acknowledging it implies the existence of some sort of ether that is a special frame of reference. The existence of the frame implies there is a level at which quantum theory breaks down. See also Bohm and Hiley 1989.

<219>:See also Baracca, Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1975 (Bergia 1988 extends the results of this paper); and Bohm 1978b: 93.

<220>:Hiley 1980: 93.

<221>:Bohm 1971b: 38; Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 171.

<222>:They are brought out, in effect, because of the manner in which physical experiments are talked about; Hiley 1980: 80.

<223>:Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 172.

<224>:Bohm 1966: 256-86; 1978a: 37-8; Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 173; and Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 9.

<225>:Bohm 1978a: 39. Further, Bohm 1978b: 91-2 suggests, the Cartesian order is only a particular case of the implicate order, of the universal holomovement.

<226>:Bohm 1980b: 178. This is similar to quantum physics, where the primary reference is to the whole rather than to individual particles; see Bohm 1973: 148; and 1978b: 92.

<227>:Bohm 1978a: 40; and 1978b: 94. A good general discussion of Bohm and Hiley's development of a mathematical model for the holomovement can be found in Briggs and Peat 1984: 136-42.

<228>:See Atkin 1971; Bohm 1971f; Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 171-4, 177-83; Hiley 1971: 181, 185-9; Hiley 1980: 93; and Hiley and Stuart 1971. It partly drew its inspiration from Wheeler's earlier work; see the discussion above on Wheeler and pregeometry. For even earlier forerunners, see Aharonov and Bohm 1963: 1629. See also Bohm 1962b: 311-4 (expanded and eveloped by Gudder 1987); 1962c: 274-80; 1963b: 188; and de Broglie, Bohm, Hillion, Halbwachs, Takabayasi and Vigier 1963.

<229>:Bohm, Hiley and Stuart 1970: 177; and Hiley 1980: 94, 98. See also Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 13; and Jammer 1988: 697.

<230>:Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 13-20; and 1981: 27-30. Bohm 1973: 156-7 provides a simple mathematical building toward the algebraic structure. See also Bohm 1986b: 192-6; 1987; and Hiley 1980: 89. There is an historical precedent for using algebras to describe movement, as well as to describe aspects of quantum behavior.

<231>:Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 13-30; 1980b: esp. pp. 706, 718-9; Hiley 1980: 94; and 1989: 17-27. The spinor nature of the algebraic formalism (in a sense the spinor can be said to describe an implicate order) is important; see Frescura 1988; Frescura and Hiley 1980a: 21-9; 1981; 1987; and Holland 1986. Moreover, there appears to be a close relationship between this work and that of the group headed by Prigogine; see Bohm 1987; Bohm and Hiley 1981a; 1983; Briggs and Peat 1984: 153-209, 231-3; and Griffin 1986a: Chaps 17-21, esp. Bohm 1986d. See also Finkelstein 1987: 293; Holland 1988; Kilmister 1987; and Zeh 1983.

<232>:Hiley 1989: 11. See also Pitowsky 1991.

<233>:Bohm 1973: 155.

<234>:Briggs and Peat 1987: 70, 74; and Buckley and Peat 1979: 148.

<235>:Garstens remarks that the real motivation behind a program such as Bohm's hidden variables theories is to avoid the rigid mechanistic reductionism that comes with the presently accepted interpretation of quantum theory. The underlying essentials of Bohm's work, its metaphysical underpinnings, he isolates as: "the impossibility of any scientific theory ever completely defining the existence of nature, the pluralism manifested by the complexity of nature, and the need to broaden the base of the scientific theory in order to see the multiplicity of nature in an increasingly unified way." See Garstens 1971: 89; and Watanabe 1984.

<236>:Bohm 1978a: 40.

<237>:Bohm 1976c: 3. See also Anon. 1957; and Newman 1958: 116.

<238>:Feyerabend 1960: 331-2. Feyerabend is critical of Bohm's attempt to justify this principle; see ibid., pp. 333-4. Lindsay 1957: 32 is also critical of it.

<239>:Insight is the basis of creativity and imagination; see Bohm 1968; 1974a; 1976a; 1985d; Bohm and Peat 1987: Chaps 5-6; Bohm and Weber 1983: 41-2; Buckley and Peat 1979: 125-6, 130-3; Keeley 1988; Keller 1984: 34; 1985; Temple 1982: 363-4; and Weber 1986: Chap. 8.

<240>:Bohm 1976c: 3. Bohm's ideas concerning the history and philosophy of science he presents in Bohm 1961; 1965: Chap. XXV, and Appendix; 1968b; 1974b. They are amplified and challenged in the replies (Bub 1974a; Causey 1974) and discussions to Bohm 1974b on pp. 392-423. See also Bohm 1973: 140-2; 1974a; 1980b: Chap. 3; 1982: 329-33 (in reply to Schindler 1982: 322-3); 1984; Bohm and Peat 1987: Chaps 1-2; Bohm and Weber 1982: 200-1; Cole 1985: 52-3, 75, 182; Feyerabend 1960: 332-8; Kilmister 1981: 303; McKinney 1987 (where Bohm is considered a relativist); Newman 1958: 111; Restivo 1983: 121-5 and 137-40; Roque 1986; and Sontag 1983. The famous philosopher of science, Feyerabend, claims Bohm as a mentor in the development of his ideas (Feyerabend 1965: 153). Restivo 1983: 124-5 outlines the affinities and the contrasts between the two philosophers.

<241>:See also Teller 1986; and Weigel 1987. One important question concerns the type of relations that might exist between a whole and its parts; see Bohm 1982: 333-9 (in reference to Schindler 1982: 323-7); n.d.; and Bohm and Weber 1983: 35.

<242>:Bohm 1974a.

<243>:Bohm 1970: 159. See also Bohm 1985e. Other thinkers have adopted the fragmentation terminology in their analyses of the problems and the cures for modern society; see, for example, D 1987; and Peters 1986.

<244>:Bohm 1969c: 42. See also Sontag 1983: 75.

<245>:Bohm 1969c: 43.

<246>:Bohm 1969c: 51-8; Feyerabend 1960: 331; and Kilmister 1981: 305.

<247>:Feyerabend 1960: 330; see also pp. 328-9. This Polanyi-like levels concept relates rather obviously to Bohm's hidden variables theory, with a different explanatory level below that usually described by quantum theory.

<248>:Pearce 1981: Chap. III also presents Bohm's holomovement metaphysics.

<249>:Bohm and Hiley 1976b: 175-6; see also the last sections in this chapter.

<250>:Briggs and Peat 1987: 70; Temple 1982: 361-3. With regard to Bohm's ideas on mysticism, see Bohm and Weber 1983: 35. See also Bohm 1980b: 19-26; and Wilber 1982b: 157-64; 1982c: 249-56, 292-4.

<251>:Jammer 1988: 695.

<252>:The key source for this section is Bohm and Weber 1978. See also Krishnamurti 1978; Krishnamurti and Bohm 1985; and Weber 1981.

<253>:Bohm 1978a: 40-1. Regarding consciousness, see also Bohm 1980a; 1980b: Chap. 7; 1986g; 1986e: 27-37; 1988: 121-3; Bohm and Peat 1987: Chaps 4-5; Bohm and Weber 1982; Bohm and Welwood 1980; Davies and Brown 1986: 120-1; Gliedman 1983; Krishnamurti and Bohm 1986; Shainberg 1987; Weber 1987; and Wilber 1982b: 168-72.

<254>:Bohm is associated with the psychologist Pribram (see, for example, his 1978; 1979; and 1981) who suggests consciousness is distributed through the brain holographically, while yet also spread out everywhere through the universe with every part knowing the whole (Jones 1982: 198-200; see also Briggs and Peat 1984: 236-68; Ferguson 1978; Weber 1978; and Zinkin 1987. Stapp 1985a presents a similar development). I do not think every use of Bohm's physical and metaphysical ideas by psychologists would meet his approval; an article co-authored by Bohm (Bohm and Welwood 1980) not only parallels physics and psychology in certain respects, but also points out several problems that might result from relying on physics and, in particular, on the holographic model for psychological theory. Bohm's name is associated with many fringe topics and movements (perhaps some would consider religion to be one of these). Taylor 1986: 64 even calls Bohm a "modern scientific guru" (Hiley 1986 replies to Taylor's review). While Bohm probably has sympathy with several of the fringe movements and ideas - for instance, he co-authored an article on investigating the paranormal for no less a prestigious science journal than Nature (Hasted, Bohm, Bastin and O'Regan 1975; see also Bohm 1986g; Briggs and Peat 1984: 151; Sarfatti 1975: 166, 168, 279, 296; and Talbot 1981: 41-2) - many could be using his name inappropriately (for instance, see Bohm and Hiley's response in their 1976b). Anon. 1984; Berman 1981; Comfort 1984; Dossey 1984; LeShan and Margenau 1982; Pearce 1985; Rogers 1986; Sarfatti 1974; 1975; Thompson 1981; Toben, Sarfatti and Wolf 1975; Valle 1981; and Wolf 1984 are examples of publications that may contain illegitimate uses. Nonlocal action-at-a-distance is useful for those trying to understand paranormal phenomena and consciousness (Bohm 1986g; Griffin 1988: 16-7; Jahn and Dunne 1986; and 1989 (concerning whose work see Costa de Beauregard 1985)). In an interview with Bell, Crease and Mann 1988: 86 write:

Bell's theorem has acquired near-religious status among certain popular authors who feel it proves the ability of subatomic particles to "think," the basic "wholeness" of the universe, faster-than-light communication, and a host of other mystical foofaraw - what the late great physicist Richard Feyman called the "cargo cults of science." Experiments proving Bell's theorem, wrote Michael Talbot recently in Beyond the Quantum, constitute "the final proof that reality as we know it does not exist at the subatomic level."

Restivo 1983: 116-7 amplifies the differences between Bohm and the other style of approach. Barlow 1985; Crease and Mann 1987; Estling 1983; Wilber 1982b: 170-85; and Zaleski 1984: 86-7 make similar points.

<255>:This is analogous to particles in physics being considered small modifications of the the background vacuum of infinite energy (that is subtracted from physical calculations by the process called renormalization). For an elaboration of this, see Bohm 1978b: 97-8, 101-2; but also see, for example, Anon. 1989. This vacuum could be what supplies the energy to enable particles to change according to the information contained in a quantum potential (Davies and Brown 1986: 140).

<256>:Bohm 1978a: 41. In this reference Bohm also outlines the similarities and differences between his view outlined above and those of several other philosophers.

<257>:Briggs and Peat 1987: 74.

<258>:Bohm 1981; see also Atkins 1989; Bohm 1976b; 1980b: Chap.1; 1983b: 218; 1988: 57-62; Buckley and Peat 1979: 142-6; McCance 1986: 293-4; and Temple 1982: 362-3.

<259>:Bohm 1988: 66-8. It may be that the reality of social and personal chaos forms a leading motivation for Bohm in his physics and metaphysics, that he is endeavouring to make the world a better place by doing what he is doing. If so, he is following a time-honored path. In Sharpe 1984 I build a similar case.

<260>:To bring the required order into the brain requires working along the principles of Krishnamurti.

<261>:This statement sounds rather gnostic.

<262>:See also Briggs and Peat 1987: 74. For further ideas of Bohm on insight, especially regarding education - an important interest of his - see his 1979 (see also Gerber 1985; Kosacoff 1986; Mayo-Chamberlain 1980; and Odell 1981). Scholars apply Bohm's ideas not only to education, but also to such disciplines as counseling (Parkinson 1982), history (Flanagan 1985), literature (Parisoff 1980), economics (Wible 1980), art (Briggs 1987), and health sciences (Malinski 1980). He is attempting to influence people toward change with his writing and public appearances; see Harré 1981: 117; and Zajonc 1981: 137 (compare this spirit with the comments in Anon. 1981).

<263>:See Keller 1984; 1985; and Restivo 1983: 35-7. Bohm's understanding of religion is also amplified in his 1968b; 1983b; and 1985b.

<264>:Hiley 1989b: 189.

<265>:Hiley 1989b: 188.

<266>:Hiley 1989b: 188-90.

<267>:Prigogine 1980. Bohm compares his and Prigogine's ideas in his 1987.

<268>:Prigogine and Elskens 1987.

<269>:I do not intend to present an overview of process philosophy or of process theology. Of the references used so far, Barbour 1966 contains such an appropriate overview.

<270>:See the section heading "The Metaphysics of Process" in Bohm 1969c: 42.

<271>:See for example, Folse 1981; Malin 1988; Stapp 1975; 1977c (replied to by Hartshorne 1977; see also Jones 1977); 1977b; 1979; 1980; 1982a; 1985a; 1985b; and 1986 (followed by responses, including Bohm 1986c). Cramer 1986 builds on Stapp's work, and Costa de Beauregard 1985 expresses reservations about it. There is a significant and burgeoning number of writings comparing positively or negatively the ideas of Bohm and Whitehead; see, for example, Cobb 1986b (responded to in Bohm 1986f: 130-2); Fowler 1976: 65; and Griffin 1985. Griffin 1986a contains a number of papers that discuss the relation between Bohm's writings and process thinking, especially regarding their concepts of time; for instance, see Barbour 1986; Bohm 1986a; Bjelland 1986: 71-2, 80; Cobb 1986; Ferré 1986: 110-1; Griffin 1986b: 15-6; 1986c; Rosen 1986; and Russell 1986a. For another use of Bohm's ideas on time, see Delacre 1985.

<272>:Hartshorne and Resse 1953 provides a run-down on various such philosophies. They are also reviewed in Birch 1979; Birch and Cobb 1981; Sheldrake 1981a: 49-54; and 1980-1: 301-8.

<273>:Sheldrake 1980-1; 1981a; 1981b; 1983; 1987a; 1987b. See also Briggs and Peat 1984: 210-35. Regarding the controversy surrounding Sheldrake's ideas see, for instance, Anon. 1983 (the results of a controversial New Scientist competition to devise an experiment to test the theory); and the Nature file of pros and cons ("A Book for Burning?", "A Haunted House of Cards", etc.): Comfort 1982; Danckwerts 1982; Hedges, Cousins, Clarke and Josephson 1981; Isaac 1981; Maddox 1981; Newth 1981; Sherwood 1982; Vasudeva 1981; and Wolff, Redgrove and Dorliny 1983.

<274>:Sheldrake 1981b: 766.

<275>:Kernan 1983.

<276>:Briggs and Peat 1984: 231-3. With regard to parallels with Bohm, see also Sheldrake 1981a: 90; and Sheldrake, Weber and Bohm 1982. Singer 1990: 64-70 brings the two together.

<277>:As mentioned before, in relation to Bohm's ideas on time, see various of the papers in Griffin 1986a. See also Bohm and Weber 1983.

<278>:Sheldrake 1981a: 12. The language used by Sheldrake bears striking similarities to that of Laszlo in his systems metaphysics, that in turn derives from Whitehead's metaphysics; see Oliver 1981: 79-94. One can also study systems thinking through Bohm's work; see Jantz 1985.

<279>:Sheldrake 1980-1: 301. Note also that Sheldrake's ideas differ in some respects from Whitehead's; see Sheldrake 1981a: 59. See also Griffin 1982.

<280>:As mentioned previously, field theories are still Cartesian since they build on the continuum idea.

<281>:Whitehead 1922; see also Fitzgerald 1972; Fowler 1975; Nebelsick 1981: 54-62; Oliver 1981: 63-7; Palter 1960: 188-213; and Wilcox 1961 (replied to by Ford 1968). For recent comments on experimental results, see Ariel 1974; Gal-Or 1981: 179; and Will 1971; 1972; 1974; 1981; 1984: 369; 1986. Rejoinders can be found in Fowler 1974; Russell 1986b; 1988b; and White 1983. Whitehead actually proposed four relativity theories and the above dismissal is of the first. The fate of the other three is the subject of current research.

<282>:Referring to gravitational waves; see Will 1984: Sect. 7-8. See also Kaufmann 1985.

<283>:Shimony 1965; but see Fowler 1976: 64. Shimony would probably not debate Riggan's 1982 claim that early advances in quantum physics were of critical significance for Whitehead in the development of his metaphysics. Shimony acknowledges Whitehead's philosophy does provide a conceptual framework for an old form of quantum theory.

<284>:That Shimony 1965 attempts to do. Writers such as Finkelstein 1974 attempt the opposite: to rebuild quantum physics on the basis of process concepts (see also his 1973).

<285>:Schumacher and Anderson 1979: 73. Schumacher 1981 presents his Bohm-based paradigm for a world-view centered on undivided wholeness. Much of the remainder of this chapter comes from Sharpe 1984b.

<286>:Douglas 1956: 136; McCrea 1991: 92-3; and Woodward and Lubenow 1979: 87. Bohr is another obvious example (Crease and Mann 1988: 92). Some of the mystical writings of various famous physicists, for instance Schrödinger, are collected in Wilber 1984 (but see Little 1984).

<287>:Capra 1977a. See also Capra 1972; 1974; 1977b; 1978; 1979c; and Weber 1982.

<288>:Capra sees, briefly, nine parallels: that Eastern mysticism and modern physics perceive the universe as a unity, holding together opposites in a complementary yin and yang manner rather than in a conflicting dualism; that space-time is a construct of the mind and not objective; that the universe is dynamic and not static; that one cannot understand the elements of matter as isolated, but only in relation to the physical background vacuum in which they are; that matter performs a dance and is not just quietly inert. He further sees a similarity between the paradoxical nature of quark symmetries and Zen koans, and between their both thinking there are no basic elements of matter: there are only patterns of change and interpenetration within the interrelations of all phenomena (the bootstrap hypothesis). See Whaling 1977: 496.

<289>:Mansfield 1976: 56. Some of the other works that draw similar parallels include: Barnett 1986; Boslough 1985: 125-7; Fagg 1985; Harrison 1979; 1979b; Jones 1980; 1986; Josephson 1983; LeShan 1974: Chap. 5 (and see Little 1984); Marsden 1983: 8-9; McCance 1986; Needleman 1975; Palihawadana 1979; Pelletier, 1978; Postle 1976; Riencourt 1981; Rolston 1989; Siu 1957; Talbot 1981 (but see Mannoia 1982); Thompson 1975; Wallace 1989; and Zukav 1979 (compare with Bohm 1980c; and with Russell 1980). See also the references in Bohm 1983a; Kauffman 1977; Restivo 1983; and Woodward and Lubenow 1979.

<290>:Gussner 1976: 1; see also Lukacs 1971. But compare with Jahoda 1982. Bohm's work inspires similar comments; for example, Comfort 1981.

<291>:Harrison 1979; and Mansfield 1976. Capra is wishing to promote a wider world-view; see his 1982. Dossey 1982; and 1984 are similar.

<292>:Haskins 1979: 141; see also Capra 1977a: Epilogue.

<293>:Crease and Mann 1988: 92, 121 (Bell says: "I don't think Bell's theorem moves you nearer to God....As poetry, I can appreciate Capra and others. But as physics, I don't appreciate them at all."); Dull 1978; Gribbin 1976; Lawson 1976; Lebowitz 1976; Powers 1982: 134-5; Russell 1975; Whaling 1977; and Woodward and Lubenow 1979: 87. Dampier 1948: 319-20 contrasts the Buddhist view existence with that of many Westerners, that evolution is downwards from the ideal of inorganic matter toward consciousness. It is highly speculative to see in the contemporary scientific world picture - even that of physics - an acceptance of consciousness as being "exogenous to the human body" (Barksdale 1980: 103). The difference must be recognized and faced. Esbenshade 1982; Jones 1980; 1986; Morris 1983: Chap. 7; Restivo 1983; and Wilber 1982b (but see Bohm and Weber 1982: 188-93; and Capra and Weber 1982) are thorough accounts and critiques of parallelist approaches. Capra's is the chief exemplar Restivo chooses: Chap. 1 details the parallels; Chap. 2 the marked pitfalls of parallelism (beyond those mentioned above, the unclear nature of the parallelism, the complexities Capra ignores, the unrigorous manner of his presenting and gathering his evidence, that his claims cannot be validated, etc.); and Chaps 5 and 6 some possible reasons for parallelists promulgating their ideas (parallelism is an ideology). See also Asimov 1980-81: 49-51; Barbour 1990: 118-20; Crease and Mann 1987 (but see McAuley et al. 1988); Gould 1983; McCance 1986: 289; Shook 1967: ix and 80; and Sperry 1985.

<294>:Clarke 1978: 289; Groothuis 1982; Henderson 1986: Chap. 7; and Peacocke 1979: 362-3. Clifton and Regehr 1990 critique Capra from their Christian perspective; I respond in Sharpe 1990: 116-9. Schmidt 1982 compares Christian theology with transpersonal psychology, spokespersons for which he chooses Capra and Bohm.

<295>:Barnett 1986: 308; Bernstein 1978/79: 7; 1984/85; Ferris 1982; Gribbin 1976; Haskins 1979; Parker-Rhodes 1978; and White 1979.

<296>:See Bernstein 1978/89: 8-9; Russell 1976: 541; Fowler 1977: 266; Parker-Rhodes 1978: 292; and Westphal 1978: 296.

<297>:Including space-time symmetries (that are equivalent to the conservation laws for physical quantities such as energy and momentum), causality (that is space-time continuity up to quantum finiteness), and unitarity (that could be paraphrased by saying an event either happens or it does not - that the probabilities add up to one); see Dull 1978: 388-9. See also Restivo and Zenzen 1981: 178-9.

<298>:Capra 1977a: 276, 291-2; Dull 1978: 389; and Peacocke 1979: 361. The originator of the bootstrap hypothesis is Geoffrey Chew; see, for instance, his 1961; 1966; 1968; 1970; 1971; 1983a; 1983b; 1984; 1985 (a comparison with Bohm); Chew, Gell-Mann and Rosenfeld 1964; Chew and Needleman 1985; Gale 1974; and Stapp 1971.

<299>:Dull 1978: 388-9; Bernstein 1978/79: 7; and Lerner 1986: 114.

<300>:Capra 1977a: 290; but see also Capra 1979. See also Harrison 1978.

<301>:Capra 1977a: 297; see also Eister 1978: 355; Goldmann 1976; and Kauffman 1977.

<302>:Fowler 1982: 90. We now need to develop a comprehensive cosmology from the sciences; this is the gist of Toulmin's 1982. Shimony 1981: 435-6 compares Capra and Bohm. Zukav 1979: 326-7 parallels Bohm's physics and Eastern psychologies, as he terms them. He says the implicate order derives from the similar Eastern religious experience of "a pure undifferentiated reality which is that-which-is." I wonder if this parallel is incorrect. For Bohm, the beyond, beyond both explicate and implicate orders, is the reality for mystical experience.

<303>:Restivo 1983: 117, 121 and 124. See also Josephson 1987: 45-7. Slisko 1988 is critical of a mystical interpretation of quantum physics.

<304>:Boslough 1985: 126-7.

<305>:Three other attempts, theoretical and practical, at using religious concepts in physics (and other sciences) can be found in the writings of Jaki (see Sharpe 1982); in Nicholas Wolterstorff's 1976; and in those of Teilhard de Chardin (his 1959, for instance).

<306>:It may be an obvious point perhaps needing specific mentioning, but this suggested use of religion in physics is not a plugging of concepts from the former into holes in the latter without any respect for the procedures of science (Singh 1961: Chap. XIV). It is the use of the former's concepts as hypotheses for the holes or shortcomings or otherwise in science, subject to the latter's methods of evaluation. It is not a "God of the gaps." Sharpe 1984 builds a case for this in much more detail.

<307>:To fill out this simplistic statement, see Barr 1977; Dumas 1976: 30-3; Macquarrie 1971; and Young 1976: Chap. 1.

<308>:See also Barbour 1966.

<309>:Austin 1976: 8-11.

<310>:Austin 1976: 6-8.

<311>:Rubble 1978.

<312>:Musser 1977: 264.

<313>:Oliver 1978: 21-3.

<314>:Oliver 1978: 24.

<315>:Perhaps MacKay would have agreed with Oliver; see his 1974b: 226.

<316>:Baillie 1962: 217. For a twelfth century example, see Palma 1976; and for a background account of Bohr's idea, see Holton 1970. Folse 1977 presents an epistemological generalization of Bohr's image of complementarity. Wilkins 1987 shows how the term is used in different subjects and outlines its history.

<317>:See, for example, Polkinghorne 1989: 71.

<318>:Reich 1990.

<319>:Barbour 1966.

<320>:Sharpe 1984.

<321>:Sharpe 1990. Some question the scientific status of sociobiology, but there is growing evidence in its favor (Irons 1991).

<322>:For example, Austin 1967a; 1967b; 1968 (but see also Park 1967); Barbour 1966: 291-2; 1974: 76; Globus 1973: 1135-6; Kaiser 1976a; and 1976b: 154.

<323>:For example, MacKay 1972; 1974a; 1978a; 1979; and 1980.

<324>:For example, Austin 1976: 80; Capra 1977a: 297; Coulson 1953; 1955; Eister 1978: 355-6; Friend 1978: 4; MacKay 1958; 1974a; 1978c; Murphy 1978: 225-6; Nemetz 1964: 220; Sachs 1976; and Wiebe 1976: 43-4.

<325>:Quoted in Rohr and Szumski 1988: 57.

<326>:Bedau 1974; Bedau and Oppenheim 1961; Doty 1958: 1104; and Oliver 1978: 24-7. Barbour has changed his mind since 1960 about the extended use of complementarity, and in 1966 was rather dubious about it, giving two conditions for its use. The second I shall mention shortly, but the first is that it not be used to justify an uncritical acceptance of dichotomies ("to avoid dealing with inconsistencies or to veto the search for unity"). See Barbour 1960: 214-5; 1966: 292-4; and 1974: 74-8.

<327>:MacKay 1974b: 234.

<328>:MacKay 1958: 114-5. Compare MacKay's definition with that offered by Lindenberg and Oppenheim in their 1974; this is specifically a generalization of Bohr's quantum mechanical complementarity. Or with those by Folse in his 1977; or Kaiser 1976b: 154.

<329>:MacKay 1974b: 225.

<330>:MacKay 1974b: 238-9.

<331>:For other potential solutions, see Horton and Finnegan 1973; and Wilson 1974.

<332>:Austin 1976: 76-80. See also, for example, Alexander 1956; 1958; Barbour 1974: 78, 144; MacKay 1957; Sharpe 1979; Walter 1977; and Wiebe 1976: 43-4.

<333>:Austin 1976: 74; and MacKay 1974b: 226.

<334>:MacKay 1974a: 91.

<335>:See Wolterstorff 1976; and Orlebecke 1977: 56 and 63.

<336>:For example, Bube 1971: 29-35; and Schilling 1973: 243-51.

<337>:Cramer and MacKay 1976.

<338>:Others besides Cramer fall victim to the confusion in MacKay's position. D.H. Mellor takes MacKay's complementarity to say that the descriptions are logically independent, while knowing MacKay's stipulation that they have common referents. See Mellor 1974: 33; MacKay 1958: 114-5. William Hasker's debate with MacKay over brain mechanism and human freedom and responsibility reflects a similar point. MacKay takes a multi-level approach while Hasker reduces them to the same level and finds them incompatible. See Hasker 1978a; 1978b; and MacKay 1978b.

<339>:Concise Oxford Dictionary.

<340>:See also Wilburn 1967a; and 1967b.

<341>:MacKay 1968: 12-3.

<342>:Orlebecke 1977: 56. Perhaps MacKay has tried too hard to put the relationship into logical concepts. Perhaps it is more of an ideal toward which to strive.

<343>:Hasker 1978a: 130-1.

<344>:I believe this is a necessary step to take in theological methodology; see Sharpe n.d.

<345>:A version of this section appeared previously as Sharpe 1991.

<346>:Reich in press: 1.

<347>:Reich in press: 2.

<348>:Reich 1990: 368-9.

<349>:Reich 1990: 376-9.

<350>:Reich 1990: 379 also feels there are difficulties in this.

<351>:Reich 1990: 378.

<352>:For example Reich 1989; 1990: 369-76; and in press.

<353>:Reich in press: 12-3.

<354>:Reich 1990: 371-4.

<355>:I am not only talking about specific instances relating a scientific and a theological statement, but also about the more general science-theology relation. Reich's model applies in a specific situation, weighing the explanatory worth of the statements about it. The overall science-theology relation is the aggregate of the relations for each situation. Complementarity is a general program that applies in each specific instance.

<356>:Reich 1990: 368.

<357>:I amplify this point in Sharpe 1987b.

<358>:Reich 1989: 67.

<359>:Reich 1990: 375-6.

<360>:Reich 1990: 371-4.

<361>:Reich in press: 13.

<362>:Reich in press: 1; and 1990: 371.

<363>:Sharpe 1984 introduces the ladder model to satisfy this.

<364>:See Austin 1976: 6-8.

<365>:Barbour's 1974 is one of the many accounts of this. One of its upshots has been the publicly vocal espousing of a close relation between science and religion, of which Capra's is a magnificent example. Russell 1985; and Stannard 1982 are two further examples from the Christian tradition. My chief attempt at justifying an integration of science and theology lies in Sharpe 1984. It is based on social grounds, a look at the mythologies of our culture and the problems arising from their inadequacies.

<366>:Austin's 1976 showing the incorrectness of positions that argue for the irrelevance of science for theology is based on this development in the philosophy of science. Most of these positions arose within understandings of science that dismiss theology as meaningless. In reaction the supporters of theology attempt to establish a rightful and necessary place for it. This they do by pointing out the rigid wall that exists between science and theology. Austin demonstrates that these impenetrable walls are but paper façades.

<367>:See, for instance, Polanyi 1959; and 1964. See also Gelwick 1975; and 1977: 132-6.

<368>:In this process the poles so intermingle with our experience as partially to determine it.

<369>:I cannot fully describe the suggested ladder type of relation. We can only work toward it, perhaps spelling it out once this process is well under way. At present, it is a model for discussion open to modification.

<370>:See MacKay's definition of the logical complementarity relation above. Also note Peter's comments in his 1979: 198-9.

<371>:I have explored this relation as presented by Jaki in Sharpe 1982. It may be interesting to note the use Jaki makes of Bohm; see Trook 1986: 119. Yet there are obvious differences between the two thinkers. For instance, Jaki insists on the linear nature of time whereas Bohm considers it in a holistic sense, every moment somehow encapsulating every other moment past and future. Another issue that may exhibit the same ladder relation centers on the anthropic principle; see Sharpe 1985 (a thorough account of the anthropic principle can be found in Barrow and Tipler 1986).

<372>:Davies in his book Superforce mentions several organismic or holistic physical theories. These include the Wheeler-Feynman theory on the possible existence of advanced electrodynamic waves (waves from the future). He also refers to such holistic theories as astrology, the Jungian theory of synchronicity, and Hofstadter's strange loops as mentioned in his book Gödel, Escher, Bach. In the latter, the whole supports its parts that in turn are the whole. See Davies 1984: 217-21. In another book, God and the New Physics, Davies frequently refers to holistic answers to various perplexing problems. In particular he often cites MacKay's level theory of complementarity discussed above (Davies 1983; see Gribbin 1983; and Bohm 1983b, a review of Davies' book). Davies expands this theory developed for Christian theology to cover other situations.

<373>:See, for example, Fowler 1980; 1982; Schlegel 1973; 1979; 1981; Heim 1953; 1957; 1962; and Raschke 1980; 1982a; 1982b. Concerning uncertainty and theology, see also Barbour 1955; 1966: 273-316; Byrne 1981; Habgood 1980: Chap. 2; Margenau 1967; Mascall 1956: 167-207; and Pollard 1958. Harrod 1986 uses nonlocality to disqualify four types of God claims.

<374>:Rietdijik 1971: 130.

<375>:Jammer 1974: 330, in reference to Belinfante. See the latter's 1973: 17-9, 313; and 1975: 98-102.

<376>:Barbour and Russell 1985: 107.

<377>:Birch and Cobb 1981: 132-3; Owens 1983 (but see Cronkite 1984). See also Birch 1975: 80. For an exploration of the significance of Bohm's work from a Roman Catholic point of view, see Schindler 1982; 1983; 1984; and 1986.

<378>:Doughty 1982: 860. Some theologians think there need be no real influence of the new physics on their subject matter. See, for instance, Emerson 1985; and Spring 1985. Peters 1985: 210, referring to Koestler 1978: 250-1, is critical of Bohm's hidden variables theory as possibly providing (as may do the holomovement idea as well) a ground-of-the-gaps. Bohm's purpose may be to fill the need he feels for a holistic actuality to unite the fragments of physical, social, personal and ideational reality.

<379>:Bohm and Hiley 1975: 106.

<380>:Russell 1985: 151-6.

<381>:Two examples of theologians espousing a critical realism are Peacocke 1984 and Barbour 1974. See also Cushing, Delaney and Gutting 1984; and Thomsen 1986e.

<382>:Russell 1985: 154-5. Von Brueck 1984 uses the holomovement idea of Bohm to understand the polarity between the universality and the concreteness of Christ.

<383>:Russell 1985: 155-6. At this point specifically Christian theology could start with the introduction of Jesus as having something to do with overcoming fragmentation.

<384>:Russell 1985: 152.

<385>:Russell 1985: 153; Bohm 1985a: 124; and 1987d. See also Bohm and Weber 1983: 43-4; and Griffin 1988: 15, 39. But see also Zaleski 1984: 87.

<386>:Bohm 1985c.

<387>:Bohm and Weber 1978.

<388>:Peters 1985: 208-12.

<389>:Bohm 1985c: 220.

<390>:Trickett 1982: 53-4. See also Josephson 1983: 38-9; he suggests equating God the orderer of nature, the intelligence behind the scenes, with the implicate order. Heelan 1983: 78-84 surveys the place of God in metaphysical schemes, including Bohm's, that derive from or relate to contemporary physics.

<391>:This concept for God may not be all that different to the one Davies proposes in his 1983. It does not mean, of course, that God is restricted to our idea of the holomovement or whatever symbol we choose. God may well be more than our concepts of God. In a previous publication (Sharpe 1982b), I tried to develop a mathematical framework with which to describe our world in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects. The algebraic model for the essential elements of the holomovement may apply to it. That is, I am offering a mathematical language in which to express Bohm's general metaphysics. If God is the holomovement, then we may have a mathematics with which to describe God.

<392>:Kaufman is not the only Christian theologian whose position is similar to Bohm's. The critique can, for instance, also be applied to such other contemporary theologians as Torrance (see, for example, his 1969a; 1969b). Kaufman's approach can be found in his An Essay on Theological Method (1975). In a previous publication (Sharpe 1979) I critique the method Kaufman proposes, concentrating especially on the question of God being the beyond.

<393>:This does not counter the distinction Peters 1985: 209 makes that for Bohm the implicate order is matter and not spirit. It is posing a question using Bohm's categories without necessarily being honest to Bohm's own terminology.

<394>:Owens 1983: 59, 130-1.

<395>:Birch and Cobb 1981.

<396>:Peat 1987.

<397>:In doing so it competes with transpersonal psychology and parapsychology.

<398>:Wan 1988 develops a theory based on Bohm's quantum potential idea where there is nonlocality at small distances but locality at large distances.

<399>:Hefner 1989.

<400>:Bohm and Weber 1978. Kafatos and Nadeau 1990 build a detailed case saying essentially that the nonlocality of the universe implies it is conscious (Chown 1991 disputes the book's claims).

<401>:A particular school of Christian theology formed the starting point for this discussion. Other perspectives and questions may arise from viewing Bohm's metaphysics and physics from other religions, or by looking at Bohm from disciplines other than theology.