BM15. 9 June 2007.
Copyright © 2007 by Kevin Sharpe. All rights reserved.
Submitted for publication.

 

A MATHEMATICAL METAPHYSICs and Theology
INSPIRED BY DAVID BOHM

 

by

Kevin Sharpe

Graduate College, Union Institute & University, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA
Harris Manchester College, Oxford University, Oxford, UK
 
10 Shirelake Close, Oxford OX1 1SN, United Kingdom
ksharpe@ksharpe.com
www.ksharpe.com


ABSTRACT.

A need exists for a mathematical language in which to express hypotheses involving qualities, without reducing them to quantities. Achieving this could allow the humanities to access mathematical functions with which to express the relationships between elements of their subject matter, and hence a flow of ideas between the humanities – including spiritual thought – and the sciences may eventuate. This paper suggests a family of topological algebras as such a medium, based on suggestions from David Bohm and his colleagues, and then explores it theologically.

KEYWORDS.

David Bohm, entanglement, mathematical metaphysics, qualities, quantities, the science-religion relationship, topological algebras.

CONTENTS.

Introduction. 3

Bohm’s Metaphysics. 4

Bohm’s Algebra. 6

From Mathematics to Physics. 7

Topologizing the Algebra: A Mathematical Metaphysics. 8

The Algebra. 8

Family of Topologies. 9

A Family of Topological Algebras. 10

Holism.. 11

A Mathematical System of Spiritual Thought 11

Using and Testing the Model 13

Conclusions. 14

References. 14


 

Introduction

Western culture usually assumes that matters objective (scientific, material, techno­logical) form a different and distinct class from matters subjective (feeling, spiritual, humanistic, moral). The physical sciences and the humanities (to place labels on the pair) have deeply absorbed this world view and over the centuries have striven to create and uphold the distinction. As a positive outcome, the distinction enables the growth of an objective, scientific method, opposing closed and dogmatic systems of religious beliefs. As a negative outcome, the distinction can lead to social and environmental chaos, unchecked technological expansion, and a lack of moral conviction (Sharpe 1984; 1993a). The radical separation between science and the humanities, especially in an extreme form between science and spiritual thought, is therefore dangerous. It is also wrong.

We should, rather, seek a relationship in which science and the humanities share a basic set of knowledge and assumptions (including investigatory methods and a foundational metaphysics) while specializing in their particular emphases (respectively, knowledge of the physical world and knowledge of the human world). The sharing would include know­ledge on subjects of mutual import. Further, the interchange would not primarily travel one-way – with, perhaps, the humanities seeking to adopt scientific method and adapting themselves to scientific knowledge – while science stands objectively firm; science needs the humanities. On the other hand, for science to learn from the humanities need not mean that it relinquish its method. Rather, it means recognizing science as a human endeavor that needs to learn from other human endeavors and to explore as hypotheses what the others have found true or pertinent.

To help this project of reconciliation and reconstruction, this paper seeks a mathematical description of both the qualitative and quantitative properties of the world, a common language in which they each can form their hypotheses and exchange their knowledge. It seeks, in other words, to create a mathematical metaphysics, an underlying plank, on which both the sciences and the humanities can stand and which allows the transport of ideas between them. The mathematics may also offer a richer vocabulary and a greater choice of ideas for the humanities, and these may help scholars in the humanities to express more adequately their ideas and the relationships among humanistic realities (by opening the possibility of using mathe­matical functions) than with current linguistic ideas.

The humanities might, in their project of reconciliation and reconstruction with the sciences, adopt a scientific or empirical approach to the accruing of their knowledge. This is not an obvious path to take. A chief stumbling-block preventing it from happening comes from the objective and quan­titative language of mathematics, which science often uses and for which it aims. Quantitative mathematics appears foreign to the qualitative humanities. Science assumes it can adequately describe the world using quantifiable observables and mathematical theory; the humanities believe they cannot. The type of mathematics this paper seeks, therefore, ought to avoid the reduction of the humanities to quantitative studies, trying to explain their subject matter only in terms of quantitative variables. A key to the challenge is this: How might mathematics express qualitative language? How might mathematics rigorously express subjective and humanistic ideas?

Early in my career, I wrote a paper that outlines how to mathematicize the world topologically, so bringing me closer to my goal (Sharpe 1982). I then came across David Bohm and Basil Hiley’s physics. Their work attempted, I sensed, to state holistic ideas in a mathematical form, but their early physics only allowed a glimpse at its humanistic significance and it was not clear how to relate Bohm’s ideas directly to mine. Further, he orients his mathematical model at the submicroscopic universe of quantum physics and I need something more general. My research then looked at several connections between his physics and his spiritual thought (Sharpe 1987a), but his spiritual ideas took me only so far and I did not agree with some of them.

I realized later that Bohm’s work provided a mathematical metaphysics as well as a mathematical system of spiritual thought. This paper states this realization and starts to expound it. My early topological explorations also become part of this current work.

Bohm’s Metaphysics

Classical physics studies each part of the universe as separate, the parts coming together to explain the whole. Bohm and Hiley (who, with their colleagues from Birkbeck College, University of London, form the ‘Birkbeck School’) disagree with this approach and take the relationships between the parts and the qualities of a part to depend on the whole (Bohm and Hiley 1975). They do see the world as made up of elementary parts arranged into systems, but consider each part to connect with every other part. The whole universe, in the Birkbeck view, forms the basic reality; the system of the whole comes first. The separate parts only temporarily approximate it. Thus, Bohm’s metaphysics centers on the idea of unbroken wholeness and denies the dominant picture of the world as made up of separate and independent parts.

With the idea of the ‘implicate order’ (or the ‘holomovement’), the Birkbeck School develops the idea of unbroken wholeness into a metaphysics (Sharpe 1987a; 1987b; 1990; 1993a; 1993b; 1997). The notion of the implicate order, they suggest, develops from three insights (Bohm 1973; 1978b; 1980; Hiley 1980):

1.      The implicate order is what is basic to reality. It is what is.

2.      The implicate order is undivided or unbroken wholeness. Each region of space and time contains in it the total order of the universe, including the past, the present, and the future. The word ‘implicate’ comes from the verb ‘to implicate,’ ‘to fold inward.’ Reality as implicate means that each portion contains information on every other portion within it.

3.      In the implicate order, movement continuously takes place. The Birkbeck School makes activity – rather than something essentially static and rigid – the basis for their proposed order.

The implicate order unfolds. Certain aspects of it lift into attention, come into relief to produce parts that appear independent. Bohm calls the reality made of these items the ‘explicate order.’ They create the stable, independent and lasting world of parts that humans experience. Then, having unfolded to become the explicate order, the implicate folds back into itself. The structured activity of reality is not the movement of objects; it is the ongoing process of implicate to explicate to implicate.

In most contexts, the implicate order does not fully become an explicate order. Not all the properties of an object appear at once. What does unfold from the implicate order to become the explicate appears as incomplete and independent parts. That does not mean, however, that the explicate order loses all of the wholeness of the implicate. Holonomy (the law of the whole) limits the breaking of a situation into independent parts; the total environment of the object restricts the process of unfolding. The parts come from a more basic whole and in the end are not separate.

One of the significant and novel features of quantum theory for Bohm appears in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (or EPR) thought experiment (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935), which deduces from the theory the existence of simultaneous correlated events that do not physically interact with each other and lie some distance apart. The events appear connected. However, argues Einstein, if a signal passes between or a causal connection links the events in the EPR situation, it would have to travel at a speed faster than light’s to make them simultaneous. According to one of relativity theory’s assumptions, called ‘locality’ or the ‘principle of local causes’ (Mann and Crease 1988: 90), signals do not travel faster than light. Quantum theory, for Einstein, must be wrong (Bohm and Hiley 1980: 51). Of course, history proved Einstein wrong and quantum mechanics correct (Aspect, Dalibard, and Roger 1982) and corroboration, extension, and application of the EPR phenomenon continues unabated (e.g., Aspelmeyer et al. 2003).

If they move beyond the formalism, most physicists now avoid Einstein’s conclusion that a connecting signal links the two simultaneous events in the EPR experiment, but merely say or imply that a correlation exists between them. ‘Connection’ suggests that something connects them; ‘correlation’ suggests a mutual relationship between them and it happens that, on changing one, the other simultaneously changes. Quantum mechanics does not explain with causes or connections why the EPR phenomenon occurs. It just predicts, through its mathematics, that it happens.

The Birkbeck physicists interpret the EPR result as representing an essential new feature, ‘nonlocality’ (now usually called ‘entanglement,’ referring to the mathematics behind the theory), in the quantum world. Entanglement suggests the opposite of locality. Establishing the entanglement of all parts of a quantum system has superseded the older approach to physics with its image of individual particles and the absoluteness of locality. The EPR experiment, generally stated, shows that when something changes, instantaneously something else happens some distance away. The change in the first object correlates through the entanglement of quantum states with the change in the second.

Bohm uses the idea of the ‘implicate order’ for the EPR situation and to explain entanglement: entanglement arises, he believes, from the implicate order whose unfolding underlies distant events in a way that unifies them. The implicate order relates them by entangling them. The system forms a changing whole that the unfolding organizes by containing and instantaneously carrying information about the whole environment. The unfolding thus influences the outcomes of all events, correlating those separated in space and time (Maroney and Hiley 1999). No direct causal connection links them – one event does not itself influence another – they just relate to each other because they both unfold from the implicate order.

Bohm, Hiley, and the other members of the Birkbeck School thus rebuild quantum theory from their informal language centered on the implicate order. They do not assume the usual quantum physical idea of complementarity or its uncertainty principle, believing the usual quantum physics wrongly leans here on the Newtonian approach. The image of the implicate order, they claim, more adequately describes the reality that quantum theory describes.

Bohm’s Algebra

The above ideas about the implicate order are philosophical and metaphysical. Bohm also needs to express them mathematically and in a 1973 paper begins to do this.

The explicate order often arises in ways that scientific instruments can observe and report in terms of Euclidean geometry, its measures, and order. Following Felix Klein (1849-1925), Bohm takes particular general transformations to determine the features of this geometry. Three displacement operators, Di, apply to three-dimensional Euclidean space, each of which defines a set of parallel lines that it transforms into themselves. Three rotational operators, Ri, also apply, and each of these defines a set of concentric circles that it transforms into themselves. Taken together, the operators define concentric spheres that the set of Ri transform into themselves. Bohm adds to these a dilatation operator R0 that changes the radius of a sphere and lines through the origin into themselves.

A displacement, Dj, acting on one set of operators, Ri, R0, can produce other operators, Ri', R0', with a different center:

(Ri', R0') = Dj(Ri, R0)Dj -1.

Rotations on the displacement Di provide displacements, Di', in new directions:

Di' = RjDiRj-1.

A displacement, Di, rotated n similar times produces the displacement, (Di)n. This allows the similar ordering and numerically description of displacements as the ordering of the integers. The process of successive displacements of the same size also provides a measure, along with an order. Just as each rotation, Ri, produces a collection of rotations with an order and a measure, so each dilatation, R0, produces a collection, (R0)n, of dilatations with an order and measure. Such displacement, rotation, and dilatation operations determine the essentials for a Euclidean geometry.

Bohm builds from his mathematical description of an explicate order to one for an implicate order. Because of the difference between operations in an implicate order and those in an explicate order, however, he prefers the word ‘transformation’ (with the symbol T) for a simple geometric change within an explicate order, and ‘metamorphosis’ (with the symbol M) for change within an implicate order. He uses E to denote a set of transformations in a particular explicate order (Di, Ri, R0) and writes that a metamorphosis will change E to E' via what he calls a ‘similarity transformation,’ where

E' = MEM-1.

For an implicate order, applying a metamorphosis M repeatedly produces (M)n, the n-times enfolding of the structure. Defining Qn = (M)n, then

Qn : Qn-1 = Qn-1 : Qn-2 = M.

This produces an order because of the similarity (in fact, equality) in the differences between the Qn; it constitutes an implicate order because the differences mark the degree of implication. Further, the equivalence of the operations M provides a measure with n as an ‘indicator of implication.’

This leaves:

·         a set of operations (metamorphoses and transformations);

·         the possibility of adding the operations, multiplying them, and multiplying them by a number;

·         a unit operation (which leaves any operation unaltered when multiplied with it); and

·         a zero operation (which leaves any operation unaltered when added to it).

These four things together define an algebra. Writes Hiley (1980: 89): ‘Not only do we have the multiplication properties of a group to describe succession, but we also have the addition (or interference) properties which makes the motion algebraic.’ Bohm (1973: 159, emphasis removed) also writes: ‘We see then that an algebra contains key features which are similar to the key features of structures built on implicate orders. Such an algebra thus makes possible a relevant mathematization that can be coherently related to the general language for discussing implicate orders.’ (A reverse question may be interesting: Does Bohm’s algebraic mathematics require the implicate order theory?)

From Mathematics to Physics

The laws of physics have up until now referred, Bohm writes, to the explicate order. The Cartesian coordinate frames in fact function chiefly to provide a clear and precise description of the explicate order (Bohm 1978a). Unfortunately, they do this with calculus and thus assume continuous space and time made up of points with no volume. This belief does not fit, at least in Bohm’s judgment, with the idea of entanglement. Rather, Bohm and his colleagues claim the holographic image as a more adequate vehicle for describing reality, especially the reality that quantum theory describes. They therefore want a mathematics to replace calculus, a way to express the implicate order ideas precisely and mathematically, while also explaining everything with the implicate order, the whole. Bohm suggests an algebra as this mathematics. The Birkbeck physicists hope with it to rebuild quantum theory from their informal language centered on the implicate order. The laws of physics, in this new mathematics, they see primarily referring to the implicate rather than to the explicate order. They hope thereby to free physics from what they see as its current contradictions and confusion (Bohm 1978a; 1978b; 1980).

In 1970, before Bohm published the above ideas using algebras, the Birkbeck School first expressed the implicate order ideas as mathematics, at least as applicable to quantum physics. They then used the language of homology and cohomology theory, which does not assume an underlying space-time continuum but, as first published, employs combinatorial topology (Bohm 1971; Bohm, Hiley, and Stuart 1970; Hiley 1971; 1980; Hiley and Stuart 1971). This provides a partial mathematical expression for wholeness in the unbreakable connection between the world humans observe and the implicate order, yet allows the idea of individual objects. Bohm and Hiley conclude, though, that the approach of combinatorial topology has only a remote hope of realizing their long-range goal because it fails to capture the essential ‘active ingredient’ of the implicate order (Hiley 1980: 88). Though it unearths ‘very suggestive ideas,’ which neatly fit with some existing theory, it lacks the ‘essential algebraic property’ (Hiley 1980: 94). They therefore abandoned the approach.

Bohm’s work on the algebraic form of the implicate-explicate orders first appeared in 1973. He suggests the algebra as the most appropriate mathematical tool, for several reasons:

1.      An algebra need not be based on a continuum-like space with its division of space into points with no volume.

2.      Algebras lie at the mathematical root of quantum physics.

3.      An algebra allows for two different operations, addition and multiplication, which together can describe sequences of events as well as interactions between them.

Bohm, Hiley, and their partners in the Birkbeck School thus want to find a suitable algebra because they believe algebras may best describe the implicate and explicate orders (Bohm 1973; 1986; 1987; Bohm and Hiley 1981; Frescura and Hiley 1980a; 1981; Hiley 1980; Hiley and Monk 1993; Monk and Hiley 1998).

In particular, the Birkbeck School wants an algebra to represent the quantum world. After their attempts with combinatorial topology, they turned their attention to the structures supporting the Clifford and simplictic algebras. They ask whether they can package quantum theory completely in these algebraic forms, and whether this can be done so that overpowering distinctions do not show between the observer and the observed. If so, they claim, they could understand quantum phenomena using the implicate order. They conclude that they can do this (Frescura and Hiley 1980a; 1980b; Hiley 1980; 1989). Hiley’s later work suggests their algebraic approach may also prove important for quantum cosmology and quantum gravity (Hiley 1989). However, the Birkbeck School has yet to convince the bulk of quantum physicists of the merits of its approach.

Topologizing the Algebra: A Mathematical Metaphysics

The Algebra

Despite the failure or stalling of the Birkbeck School’s attempts to found the quantum world on the above algebras, the basic model of an algebraic structure still remains a possibility for metaphysically modeling the implicate and explicate orders. This more general pursuit stands independent of the physics so that, if the physics falters, the metaphysics might remain. The object is to develop the general algebraic model into a metaphysics and then to ask about its possible base for a theology.

An algebra comprises a set, two operations, a zero, and a one. To discuss Bohm’s algebra, though, we need to specify to what the set, the operations, the zero, and the one refer. The set is assumedly Euclidean space, R3. For the Birkbeck School, the multiplicative operation of the algebra represents the movement of the implicate order (the succession of events) and the additive operation represents the interaction between events (their interferences with each other).

Family of Topologies

How is the set R3, on which the algebra is defined, further structured? The word ‘structuring’ involves, not only the algebraic interaction between them, but the ‘values’ or ‘measure’ that might apply to points and subsets both as they exist in apparent isolation and as they transform under the operations. Such values in the sciences usually mean the line of numbers and refer to measurable quantities. This cornerstone of the scientific method is inadequate for a metaphysics that hopes to encompass a broader range of human experience than measurable quantities; somehow the algebraic structure for such a mathematical metaphysics ought to operate on the mathematical representations of qualitative variables as well as on the quantitative ones.

How to represent qualities mathematically thus becomes the challenge. Once a mathematical representation for qualities and for quantities has emerged, one that can assimilate an algebraic structure, then the basic vocabulary exists with which mathematically to ask and answer questions concerning the metaphysics’ vision of reality.

The metaphysics proposed to answer this challenge involves a topo­logical mathematical description. A topology for a space X is a family τ of subsets of X such that the union of any number of members of τ, and the intersection of a finite number of members of τ, are members of τ. The mathematical understanding of the world this metaphysics proposes says that each of the various properties (qualitative and quantitative) that the world or parts of the world appears to have uniquely defines (as elucidated below) a topology for its space.

The task initially constructs the topologies and spells out the relationship that can exist between a property and its equivalent topology. What follows introduces the steps in the development; the original paper on this subject contains the details, plus points and questions that these moves might raise (Sharpe 1982).

1.      Isolate the properties (qualitative and quantitative) of the world (assumed to be Euclidean R3 at a moment in time); for instance, the color yellow. Human explanation starts with such an abstraction: the properties of the world result from the attempt to create order out of the chaos of sense impressions.

2.      Divide the (spatial) world up into volumes Pn with the same value (or equal realizations) of a particular property; for instance, the outline of everything yellow in front of the observer.

3.      Order this set of volumes, P, each with a different value of the property, to form a ‘partially ordered set’ (or ‘poset’): for two volumes P1 and P2, P1 is less than P2 (written P1 ≤ P2) when P1 has a lower value of the property in question than has P2 (for instance P1 appears a lighter yellow than P2). (The order ≤ on the set P creates a poset (P, ≤).)

A unique relationship exists between the partial ordering of subsets of a space (like R3) that a property produces, and a topology (with certain characteristics) on the space (R3). The reverse also holds: any such topology uniquely identifies with a partial ordering.

In summary, this mathematical model states that a topology on Euclidean R3 uniquely associates with the actualization of a property (qualitative or quantitative) in the world at a moment of time. The justification and elaboration of this association involves a construction that divides the world up into volumes with different values of some given property, relates the volumes by a partial ordering with the relative values of the property, and calls on a mathematical technique to convert the posets into topologies.

A Family of Topological Algebras

The above discussions outlined the construction of a Bohmian algebra and the topology for a property. These together form a topological algebra if the topology renders the operations of the algebra continuous. An algebra and a topology for a property form a topological algebra if the operations + and . are continuous on R3 with the property topology, that is, if their inverses map members of the topology back into members of the topology. Does this occur?

Continuity can be seen from the way a metamorphosis of implicate orders transforms local relationships. Hiley writes about holograms:

consider the relation between the object that is being hologrammed and the hologram itself. We find that the local features of the object no longer appear as local features on the hologram. The locality relation of each region of the object has been transferred to every portion of the hologram. Locality is thus ‘stored’ in a non-local way, but notice the original local relations have not been lost. They can be recovered, using the appropriate laser light (Hiley 1980: 90).

Bohm’s image of enfolding-unfolding (for instance, his image of droplets of dye dropped onto glycerol and folded into it by stirring, and then unfolded from it by stirring in the opposite direction (Bohm 1980)) works in reverse too; locality is preserved both ways. The close proximity of points after metamorphoses (involving either of the algebraic operations) that were proximate beforehand implies the continuity of metamorphoses. The Bohmian algebra thus forms a family of topological algebras.

The above develops a mathematical framework with which to describe the world in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects, and to which the algebraic model for the essential elements of the implicate order applies. The above also develops a family of topological algebras: a mathematics of the implicate order in which each property refers to a topology under which metamorphoses are continuous. It offers a mathematical language with which to express Bohm’s metaphysics in a general way.

Holism

The implicate order approach proposes a form of holism, because the whole lies in any of its parts and what happens to any part affects all others. The popularity of Bohm’s metaphysics derives in part because of its holistic vision: implicate wholes reach a level of explanatory importance that explanations at the explicate level of parts cannot take away.

In that this holism carries over with the mathematics of the algebra, an algebra (and, in particular, the algebraic model of the implicate order) is holistic; Bohm develops a mathematics of wholes. Wholes tie to the implicate order and algebras offer a way to relate wholes to parts. The implicate order models the whole-parts relationships and the algebra models an implicate order.

How adequate is this mathematics of holism? Does Bohm’s implicate-explicate theory and its algebraic mathematicization picture the whole-parts relationship well?

The model of the implicate order may offer more than holism needs. The implicate order has properties – for instance, that every part contains the whole – that wholes in general need not have.

Second, one aspect of holism (a whole exceeds the sum of its parts) may not apply in the algebra model because, in any algebra, the product of two terms equates to the sum of scalar multiples of other terms:

AiAj = ∑K λKij AK

for numbers λKij. So a whole equals a sum of parts. This suggests the reductionist nature of algebraic holism, and raises the question of what constitutes holism. Can it say only that any of the parts of a whole can interrelate, while allowing that the whole may equal the sum of parts (see Sharpe and Walgate 2003)?

A Mathematical System of Spiritual Thought

Besides as a vehicle for Bohm’s metaphysics, this framework may have relevance for spiritual thought and hence complement Bohm’s forays (e.g., 1980) from his physics and mathematics into the spiritual. It may, for instance, enable the humanities (including spiritual thought) and the theories of some sciences to dialogue via a mathematical language. It also offers to the humanities a conceptual array of mathematical concepts with which to express their ideas, an array that is wealthy, is as yet largely unexplored by them, and that supplements their usual linguistic concepts. They could use this metaphysics by posing theories in it and so express them mathematically while remaining fully humanistic and not mechanical or arithmetic.

For instance, suppose Ultimate Reality is or is like the implicate order, then the above may provide a mathematics with which to conceptualize Ultimate Reality (see Sharpe 1993b; 1997; 2000). The (implicate order-explicate order) whole-parts relationship of the mathematical metaphysics models the Ultimate Reality-universe relationship. Questions arise, such as:

·         Does the implicate order algebra display behaviors or attributes one might associate with Ultimate Reality? In particular, does it make sense to speak – as does the implicate order model – of anything as containing everything else (including Ultimate Reality), though with less detail than the original?

·         One way Ultimate Reality relates to everything is through entanglement. What does this mean and to what does it lead?

·         Do the two algebraic operations, + (succession) and . (interference), correspond to something spiritually significant?

##Is this mathematics really a system of spiritual ideas, at least rudimentarily? To help answer this question, one might ask what essentially makes a system of ideas spiritual. When does a metaphysics become spiritual? Perhaps an adequate system of spiritual ideas ought at least to say:

1.      Ultimate Reality exists;

2.      people live in relationship with Ultimate Reality; and

3.      the nature of Ultimate Reality extrapolates from human attributes.

With regard to the proposed mathematical metaphysics and each of the above three points:

1.      If Ultimate Reality constitutes the implicate order, then this point occurs automatically.

This idea of Ultimate Reality as the implicate order compares with Paul Tillich’s idea of  the ‘Ground of Being.’ In the metaphysics suggested here, this is Ultimate Reality ‘sustaining’ the universe.

2.      This also automatically holds with Ultimate Reality as the implicate order because everything exists in continuous folding into and out of Ultimate Reality.

Ultimate Reality acts in ways that mathematical functions acting on the family of topological algebras may model. Anything possible in the world, when it occurs, is Ultimate Reality at work.

Hints of Ultimate Reality’s existence surface when wholeness appears, in entanglement phenomena for example. This may affect humans through their brains, according to the theory of Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff (Penrose 1994; Sharpe 2000; see also Hiley 2001).

3.      This would also obtain because of the whole-part relationship of humans to reality as implicate. What constitutes the human is the human part of the whole (Ultimate Reality) that contains everything. What these properties comprise in their extrapolated Ultimate Reality and implicate form asks a relevant question, but unanswerable at present. What one can know of them will only emerge as they become explicated in relation to specific situations.

Using and Testing the Model

How does this topological algebraic way of describing the world, a way that allows discussion of both the quantitative and the qualitative in one language, offer itself for use and testing?

Consider first the formulation of testable hypotheses and theories in this language. Such hypotheses would center on the relationships between properties of the world. For instance, suppose that, if an object has property P1, then property P2 obtains. This might require the reaching of thresholds: if object O1 has property P1 beyond the level held by object O0, then property P2 will obtain for O1. It does not matter whether the properties are qualitative or quantitative; in particular, quality-involving theories, especially ideas from the humanities, could use this sort of language.

Put in topological terms, two topologies, τ1 and τ2 on R3, interact to produce a third topology τ3. The interaction constitutes a mathematical function that creates from τ1 and τ2 a new arrangement of subsets of R3. This, when related back to the partial ordering of subsets of R3, says the object that is the subject of the hypothesis should find itself in a particular sort of relationship with other objects with respect to the value of the third property. The hypothesis thus becomes expressible mathematically as a function mapping two topological spaces onto a third.

Specific sorts of topological algebras (plus specific restrictions on the algebras) might help model specific aspects or realms of reality, as the Birkbeck School does for the quantum world.

The testing of this proposed mathematical metaphysical tool and model differs from but could relate to the testing of hypotheses framed in its language. How adequate is the topological algebra model in general?

1.      The assumptions behind the meta­physics could seek support. If they show themselves inadequate, wrong, or inconsistent, then the language derived from them becomes questionable. Are all the assumptions necessary? Bohm suggests something even broader than an algebra:

Of course, algebra is in itself a limited form of mathematization. There is no reason in principle why we should not ultimately go on to other sorts of mathematization (involving, for example, rings and lattices or still more general structures which have yet to be created) (Bohm 1973: 160).

Thus, one may ask about the adequacy of an algebra as a mathematical base for the metaphysics. Does emphasizing wholeness versus the more specific idea of the implicate order (because of which, Bohm requires an algebraic form) still require the two operations? Listing the properties of a whole and of the implicate order, and then rendering them into a mathematical form might help answer this. It would show what mathematical structure fulfills them.

2.      Consider its adequacy in (at least) two operational ways: to see if the proposal allows the adequate expression of known quantitative laws, and to ask if the proposal can produce further rational theories that prove successful in prediction and verification. The metaphysical framework will find support or justification if it allows the adequate statement of qualitative theories that prove themselves under testing.

3.      Similarly, consider its inadequacy: does it produce theories or predictions that prove unsuccessful against observation?

4.      Questions need asking that push the proposed system of thought to see if it proposes reasonable answers. For instance, its implications for boundaries – including the very large and the very small – may also help in its evaluation. In addition:

  1. What happens to time? The above construction defined the family of topologies for a moment of time. Transformations and metamorphoses move the topologies through time, but the model needs exploring to take this into account.
  2. Do spiritual uses of the idea of information (as in Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne’s suggestion that Ultimate Reality interacts with the world by informing it rather than by physically acting in it (Peacocke 1993; Polkinghorne 1991; Sharpe 2000)) relate to Bohm’s ideas about the quantum potential (or Louis de Brogie’s ideas of a pilot wave) carrying information – such as entanglement effects – to a system (Sharpe 1993a)?
  3. Does this help throw light on why nature appears to obey mathematical laws?

Conclusions

A need exists for a mathematical language in which to express hypotheses involving qualities, without reducing them to quantities. To achieve this might allow the humanities access to mathematical functions with which to express the relationships between elements of their subject matter. The functions might also aid a flow of ideas between the humanities and the sciences, including theology and the sciences. A family of topological algebras is offered as such a medium.

It remains to see whether an algebra (with or without topologies) offers an adequate or appropriate model for reality, where it works and where it does not, and whether the Bohmian algebras allow further explication.

References

Aspect, Alain, Philippe Grangier, and Gérard Roger. 1982. Experimental Realization of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm Gedankenexperiment: A New Violation of Bell's Inequalities. Physical Review Letters 49:2, pp. 91-94.

Aspelmeyer, Markus, Hannes R. Böhm, Tsewang Gyatso, Thomas Jennewein, Rainer Kaltenbaek, Michael Lindenthal, Gabriel Molina-Terriza, Andreas Poppe, Kevin Resch, Michael Taraba, Rupert Ursin, Philip Walther, and Anton Zeilinger. 2003. Long-Distance Free-Space Distribution of Quantum Entanglement. Science 301:5633 (1 August), pp. 621-623.

Bohm, David. 1971. Space-Time as an Abstraction from ‘Spinor’ Ordering. In Perspectives in Quantum Theory: Essays in Honor of Alfred Land, ed. Wolfgang Yourgrau and Alwyn van der Merwe (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), pp. 78-90.

_________. 1973. Quantum Theory as an Indication of a New Order in Physics. B. Implicate and Explicate Order in Physical Law. Foundations of Physics 3:2, pp. 139-168.

_________. 1978a. The Implicate or Enfolded Order: A New Order for Physics. In Mind in Nature: Essays on the Interface of Science and Philosophy, ed. John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin (Washington, DC: University Press of America), pp. 37-42.

_________. 1978b. The Implicate Order: A New Order for Physics. Process Studies 8:2, pp. 73-102.

_________. 1980. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

_________. 1986. Time, the Implicate Order, and Pre-Space. In Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time: Bohm, Prigogine, and Process Philosophy, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), pp. 177-208.

_________. 1987. The Implicate Order and Prigogine’s Notions of             Irreversibility. Foundations of Physics 17:7, pp. 667-677.

Bohm, David, and B. J. Hiley. 1975. On the Intuitive Understanding of Nonlocality as Implied by Quantum Theory. Foundations of Physics 5:1 (March), pp. 93-109.

_________. 1980. Einstein and Non-Locality in the Quantum Theory. In Einstein: The First Hundred Years, ed. Maurice Goldsmith, Alan Mackay, and James Woudhugsen (Oxford: Pergamon Press), pp. 47-61.

_________. 1981. On a Quantum Algebraic Approach to a Generalized Phase Space.  Foundations of Physics 11:3-4 (April), pp. 179-203.

Bohm, David, B. J. Hiley, and Allan E. G. Stuart. 1970. On a New Mode of Description in Physics. International Journal of Theoretical Physics 3:3 (February), pp. 171-183.

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_________. 1980b. The Algebraization of Quantum Mechanics and the Implicate Order. Foundations of Physics 10:9-10 (October), pp. 705-722.

_________. 1981. Geometric Interpretation of the Pauli Spinor. American Journal of Physics 49:2 (February), pp. 152-157.

Hiley, B. J. 1971. A Note on Discreteness, Phase Space, and Cohomology Theory. In Quantum Theory and Beyond: Essays and Discussions from a Colloquium, ed. E. W. Bastin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 181-190.

_________. 1980. Towards an Algebraic Description of Reality. Annales de la Fondation Louis de Broglie 5:2, pp. 75-103.

_________. 1989. Cosmology, EPR Correlations, and Separability. In Bell’s Theorem, Quantum Theory, and Conceptions of the Universe. ed. Menas Kafatos (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp. 181-190.

_________. 2001. Non-Commutative Geometry, the Bohm Interpretation, and the Mind-Matter Relationship. AIP Conference Proceedings 573, pp. 77-88.

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_________. 1984. From Science to an Adequate Mythology. Auckland: Interface Press.

_________. 1987a. Christian Theology and the Metaphysics, Physics and Mathematics of David Bohm. Ph.D. Thesis. Boston: Boston University.

_________. 1987b. David Bohm’s Physics and Religion. In Science and Theology in Action, ed. Chris Bloore and Peter Donovan (Palmerston North, New Zealand: The Dunmore Press), pp. 72-83.

_________. 1990. Relating the Physics and Religion of David Bohm. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 25:1 (March), pp. 105-122.

_________. 1993a. David Bohm’s World: New Physics and New Religion. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press.

_________. 1993b. A Holomovement Metaphysics and Theology. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 28:1 (March), pp. 47-60.

_________. 1997. A Holomovement Metaphysics and Theology. Bridges: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Theology, Philosophy, History, and Science 4 (Spring-Summer), pp. 125-144.

_________. 2000. Sleuthing the Divine: The Nexus of Science and Spirit. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

_________, and Jonathan Walgate. 2003. The Emergent Order. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 38:2 (June), pp. 411-433.