Kevin J. Sharpe, 'THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE AS DIFFERENT LEVELS OF A HIERARCHY: A Caution'

SR03. 11 June 1992.
Copyright © 1996 by Kevin Sharpe. All rights reserved.
In DNA to Dean: Essays in Honour of Arthur R. Peacocke, by Members of the Society of Ordained Scientists (unpublished), pp. 186-202.

THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE AS DIFFERENT LEVELS OF A HIERARCHY:

A CAUTION^{^[i]}

Kevin J. Sharpe

ABSTRACT. Relating theology and science often means taking them as levels of a hierarchy, theology being higher than science. The same happens with God and the world. I develop steps for implementing this model based on the need for the mutual relevance of the two disciplines. Arthur Peacocke adds the idea that God interacts with the world-as-a-whole similarly to how, in R. W. Sperry’s model, the mind interacts with the brain. I raise questions about this and propose that God is the world-as-a-whole that acts on the parts of the world.

KEY WORDS. God-World Relation; Hierarchies of Levels; Holism; Arthur Peacocke; Theology-Science Relation; Top-Down Causation.

A common way for relating theology and scientific theories is to say they occupy levels arranged in a hierarchy. This essay assesses the levels model, especially noting its dangers. I suggest caution in using it to avoid separating theology and science.

The work of Arthur Peacocke is useful for bringing out my concerns. I also will discuss his use of top-down causation in the God-world relation. A recent issue of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science featured Peacocke’s work, and two issues earlier there were articles by two other scholars (John Polkinghorne and R. W. Sperry) whose ideas are important to this discussion (Polkinghorne 1991, Sperry 1991, and the December 1991 issue of the journal). Polkinghorne wants to understand how the different levels relate to each other, but “the problems are mostly too hard for current knowledge” (Polkinghorne 1991, 222). Despite knowing this, he and Peacocke are not cautious enough in their attempts to relate the world and a higher-level God.

The Levels Model

It is only recently that science and religion has moved from an amateur pursuit to being a self-reflective discipline. This change has lead to probing of the relations between theology and scientific theory. It was popular to say they are complementary or occupy different levels. Theology’s level is higher than science’s, it was also thought, meaning theology must be consistent with but say something science does not. These approaches now face scrutiny.

The hierarchy of levels model comes from the idea that nature has different levels. Harold Schilling made this approach clear in his 1973 book, The New Consciousness in Science and Religion, though he is only one of many to do so (Schilling 1973, 59-60). He says there are three key ideas about the interior depths of matter. The first is of levels in the organization of the physical world. That there are different structural hierarchies of various levels is the second. Finally is the idea that the levels of a hierarchy are partly independent of one another.

Later in his book, Schilling applies the levels model to theology and science (Schilling 1973, 243). He says they deal with different levels of reality, one to do with ultimacy and the other with nature. Each has developed a language or vocabulary that is inadequate for talking about the other’s reality. Scientific language, for instance, refers to nature’s levels and cannot handle those of ultimacy, including ideas about God. Religious language similarly cannot handle physical ideas such as natural causes, the weather, or the brain.^{^[ii]}

I call the idea of hierarchies of levels as Schilling describes it, the levels model. I omit the word hierarchy because the idea of levels implies it, at least locally. For if the (metaphorical) heights of the levels were not different, we would not use the word level.

Mutual Relevance and the Levels Model

Much of my unease with the levels model has to do with relevance. I use the word in William Austin’s senses of direct and quasi-direct relevance (Austin 1976).

A collection of statements of one field has direct relevance to a statement in another field if the collection or its negative implies the statement. An example is the comparison between biology and the religious belief that all people have descended from Adam and Eve. From biology, scientists conclude there was no one couple from which humanity descends.

Austin’s quasi-direct relevance of two theories means they offer alternative, apparently competing, explanations of the same data. The theories could come from any fields or from one. The competing explanations offered by Paley and Darwin for the way organisms have adapted to their environments is an example Austin gives of this type of relevance.

One field is relevant to another, I would say, if the following applies. The data each considers overlap and there are statements in the first field directly relevant for statements in the second. Alternatively, the two fields have theories with quasi-direct relevance for each other. The example from human evolution given for direct relevance suggests science is relevant to theology. Theology also may be relevant to science, in which case science and theology are mutually relevant (Sharpe In Press 1).

I believe science and theology are mutually relevant and we should actively pursue this, following its implications. We should do this for humanity’s and the environment’s health, perhaps survival - but I will not support this belief here (see Sharpe 1984). From this perspective, the levels model has a problem.

(1) The levels model for the science-theology relation does not address the relevance question. So using it uncritically can lead to problems.

An outline of a common use of the levels model may make this point clearer. Assume science is at a lower level than is theology, and that science is relevant for theology. For Ernan McMullin, this means making theology consonant with scientific knowledge. To do this he makes theology a source for a broad world-view that interprets scientific theories to make them “maximally acceptable from the Christian standpoint” (McMullin 1981, 51).^{^[iii]} He supposes science does not address meaning questions and that theology goes beyond it by, for example, putting it in the context of ultimate meanings. Theology then becomes consistent with science, but does not add to or challenge it. McMullin wants to reduce conflict by creating a broader world of meaning in which the two can relax in harmony.

McMullin uses the levels model and avoids the mutual relevance of science and theology. This is because the model leaves open whether or not theology should adapt its content to the knowledge of the sciences. Neither does it address whether or not science should take seriously the insights of theology. The traffic may only be one way (science to theology) and then theology need not take it seriously. Without clarifying these questions, the model is confusing. Should theology and science be mutually relevant, or not? If they are mutually relevant, should they act on the relevance? By not addressing these key questions, it leads writers like McMullin to assume answers without carefully thinking about their implications.

Using the Levels Model Cautiously

The levels model also can lead to further confusions, this time about the God-world relation. I turn to causality. There may be causal relations between the levels of a hierarchy within a theory. We instinctively assume a bottom-up causation in such a hierarchy: the behavior of the parts of something largely determines its behavior and properties. The problem is the reverse causation. How does the higher level affect the lower? I want to focus on this causal relation between entities within a theory, in particular between God and the world.

Before continuing I need to clarify a point.

The above examples apply the model to the sciences and to the theology-science relation. Within their theological theories, theologians often also take God to be on a higher level than is the world. This is a third use of the levels model, namely within theology. There is a difference between hierarchies of theories and hierarchies of entities within a theory.

There is, however, an equivalence between the theory levels and the levels of theological entities. On the theory side, theology’s level is usually higher than is science’s. On the theological entity side, God’s level is usually higher than is the world’s. The entity placements probably determine, if they are not equivalent to, the theory placements. Since God is higher than the world, the discipline whose subject is God is higher than disciplines whose subject is the world. Further, the mutual relevance of theories about God and those about the world is equivalent to theology and science being mutually relevant. Hence, I will move between discussing theories and discussing entities without noting the change.

Having made this distinction, I return to the levels model and the causal relation of a higher level on one lower than it. The points below form a chain that an application of the model might follow to address relevance.

(2) Theology should take science openly, making itself consistent with it. An upper-level theory needs to take the content of those on the lower levels seriously. This means theology take science openly, that theology respect the range of science’s explanations, including its conservation laws. This is consonance, not in the sense of creating a higher metaphysical level that holds existing theology and science in a consistent framework (as in, for example, McMullin’s proposal). Rather, it is making the content of theology consistent with science. For instance, telling the story of creation needs to use the theories and knowledge of modern cosmology. Theology takes into itself the theories of science.

(3) Theology should work out how God can act on and in the world consistent with both its own theories and with those of science. When it does take science openly, theology usually creates a hierarchy of levels where God is higher than the world. It then tries to make sense of the two in this arrangement. This process can soon run into a snag. In the above creation example, for instance, theology says God did the creating, but cannot say how and when God did it. Did God create the big bang?

Ideas about the upper-level God reach a point where they make causal contact with ideas about the lower-level world. When this happens, theologians need to work out how the upper-level God can act on the lower levels of the world. This action must be consistent with the established properties of both the lower level and the upper level.

(4) There must be problems with the explanatory power of science. The focus of this activity is not all on the upper God-level. Any upper level has holistic properties that go beyond those explained by the lower levels. Thus there must be problems with the explanations of the lower level theories and these need identifying.

The difficulties may not appear when concentrating on a particular level of explanation because each may look complete. The problems may emerge only on stepping back to take a larger or more holistic view.

This may not always be the case, though. Not all levels appear complete to themselves. Several recent theoretical developments in cosmology arise from continually asking the question, “Where does that come from?” Theories trace the universe back to creation in the big bang that in turn comes from quantum fluctuations in its own very early phases. These in turn depend on the laws of physics or a primitive version of them. The origin of the laws is, on the other hand, a matter over which cosmologists scratch their heads. It may lie beyond explanation by science (see Halliwell 1991 and Sharpe n.d. 1). Perhaps cosmology’s questions, while raised within its own level, find answers from a higher level such as metaphysics.

Thus, we should not generalize and draw a hard and fast boundary line over which science may never step. In particular, a scientific discipline may appear incomplete to itself and realize it needs higher-level ideas.

(5) Theology should then work back into itself how God acts on and in the world. The fourth step involves addressing these problems in science using the upper level’s explanations. To do this may require the idea of God and the theoretical tools developed in (3), but used in ways consistent with science. Theologians are then fleshing out how God acts on and in the world. In the cosmology example, theology may suggest God produces the laws of science, showing specifically how they might come from a God understood to have certain characteristics.

By doing this, theologians bring theology to science, making the two interact with and add to each other to form a more complete understanding.^{^[iv]} It is to make theology relevant to science.

This is a God-of-the-gaps position, but with a twist. Such positions usual involve thinking of God’s intervening in the otherwise regular course of nature. One could qualify “the regular course of nature” in this age of chaos and other revolutionary theories, but I leave such matters aside. It is the idea of intervention that I wish to discuss. The debates around the idea of God’s breaking natural laws are old. Many people have pointed out that an interventionist theology does not take seriously the scope and consistency of scientific explanations. It also raises a larger problem for theology. If God acts only by intervention, then God is distant from the world and ceases to be an imminent sustainer.

I conclude that intervention is not God’s primary way of interacting with the world. The actions of God I am considering are not interventions; in a way they add to the explanations of current science. So this is not the usual God-of-the-gaps position.

Doing theology this way makes it vulnerable. I believe theology should and does change as science and human experience change, and so the theories it comes up with may be wrong. It should not see itself as adding minor details to an otherwise fixed set of dogmas. Rather, it should try to explain problems in science and elsewhere. It can do this knowing that, because of Gödel’s and others’ work, science will never explain everything.

Peacocke’s Models

Peacocke explicitly uses the levels model in his theology and science writing. His recent book, Theology for a Scientific Age, is a good example. It is interesting to observe him answering the above series of points about the model without appearing conscious of a theoretical framework such as I have outlined.

He initially follows the image Schilling uses of the world as a hierarchy of levels. Different levels require different ideas; there are sciences peculiar to each level. The explanations of higher levels do not reduce, he believes, to those of lower levels. He also stresses that the structures and entities of the world connect and relate with one another. He provides two examples of top-down causation (the effect of higher levels on lower ones), something he believes exists and is important (Peacocke 1990, 37-61).^{^[v]}

One of the examples is the mind-brain relation, for which he draws on the work of Sperry. He writes that the state of the brain-as-a-whole is a level that controls what happens at the lower neuron level. There is, that is, a top-down interaction - actual causal connections - between the total state of the brain and the neurons. Sperry and Peacocke then say that mental events are descriptions of total states of the brain. They are not events in the mind, a non-physical something that is distinct from matter and interacts with the physical brain. They refer to the brain-as-a-whole (Peacocke 1990, 60-61 and Sperry 1991, 243-46).

Having discussed the levels model as applied to the world and holistic theories applied to portions of it, Peacocke turns to theology. How might God act in the world in the face of science’s ability, at least as commonly believed, to explain most if not all phenomena? This is the causal joint problem. There are other tools for responding to this problem besides calling upon intervention. A particularly useful one is top-down causation. Peacocke speaks of top-down causation from the higher-level God to the world and develops a model based on the mind-brain relation. God’s level is one of personal agency and human qualities. He sees God continuously influencing the world-as-a-whole in a top-down way similar to how our thinking affects our bodies (Peacocke 1990, 161, and pp. 157-63, 210-11).

God the highest level acts on the world-as-a-whole that then acts on the various levels of the world down to its parts. I call it down-trickling providence.^{^[vi]} Note that Peacocke believes we would not observe this divine “causative influence” as intervention or interference in the regular course of nature (Peacocke 1990, 163).

A further point is that top-down causation builds from the levels model. This is because it needs to separate wholes from parts. There are phenomena or events in the lower level of parts that its concepts cannot explain but those of the higher holistic level can. The two models are, therefore, related but separate assumptions.^{^[vii]}

Questions for Peacocke’s Model

I do not want to critique Peacocke’s theory in depth. My interest is in how it uses the levels model and the types of problems that might follow.

First I want to compare Peacocke’s theory with the above chain of points about the levels model. As I think Peacocke would believe in the mutual relevance of theology and science, the chain is necessary for his use of the levels model. I note the following. His theology does take science openly. It does try to work out how God can act on the world consistent with its own theories and those of science. Perhaps its weakness comes in identifying where God acts on or in the world. He may begin to falter in identifying problems in the explanatory power of science. I will return to this.

There is another series of points and questions of the models and analogy Peacocke uses. They specifically look at the holistic top-down causation theory and the down-trickling providence it implies. Looking at these is important because the God-world relation it entails is Peacocke’s way of bridging the space between the levels he suggests exist. It says how God will interact with the world and hence how theology and science are mutually relevant.

(6) God acts on the world-as-a-whole but the mind is the brain-as-a-whole. Peacocke’s panentheism says God acts on the world-as-a-whole as opposed to being the world-as-a-whole. This is different from the mind-brain case in which the mind is the brain-as-a-whole. The analogy between the mind-brain and God-world therefore breaks down here, significantly.

There being another level to cross worsens the problem of how the higher-level God can act on the lower-level world. Now Peacocke needs to explain not only how the world-as-a-whole acts on its parts, but how God can act on the world-as-a-whole. It also puts the actions of God one further step away from being apparent to the lower levels. On the other hand, it helps Peacocke defend God’s transcendence and protects him from pantheism.

(7) The status of Sperry’s mind-brain model, and the certainty of its theological adaptation. Does the neuroscience community accept the holistic mind-brain model Peacocke presents? Does the theory have empirical support? If so, how does consciousness or mind cause or control the brain events? What are the details, scope and boundaries of its action? Have researchers found the causal chain?^{^[viii]} I assume there are satisfactory answers to these questions.

If not and most of neuroscientists do not endorse Sperry’s model, it may lose its importance for theology. By developing the neuroscience model into one for theology, Peacocke is suggesting it has scientific support and is therefore a serious contender for theology. I question this. We cannot import the certainty of the existence of the holistic interaction with the analogy. Peacocke may respond that it is still useful for theology even if neuroscience rejects it. He is correct that theology may still consider it, but it is then a weaker option. Part of its force for theology lies in its being a holistic interaction seriously believed by a scientific discipline.

(8) The theological model’s top-down causation and the analogy. Suppose we follow Peacocke and say the affects of the brain on the neurons is specific, demonstrable, indisputable. Can we say the same about the effects of God on the world or the world on its parts? Theologians need to show that the effects of God on the world-as-a-whole and it on its parts are specific, demonstrable, and indisputable. They need to do this regardless of the status of Sperry’s model - even if neuroscience supports its holistic effects. If they cannot, the analogy is weaker still. The force of the model does not pass over with the analogy, and neither does the reality of the holistic effects.

(9) The reality of the theological model’s top-down causation. Point (8) goes further and in doing so relates to (4) and (5). Suppose theology decides to work with Sperry’s model as carried over by Peacocke. Then the questions I asked above for the neuroscience model lead to similar questions for the theological one. Does it have empirical support? How do God and the world-as-a-whole cause the events in the world, what are the details, scope and boundaries of their actions? How does God constrain or interact with the world-as-a-whole and it constrain the parts of the world? Have researchers found causal chains? What is the holistic interaction by which the whole works on the parts?

One might sum up these questions by asking where Peacocke’s model of down-trickling providence suggests observing God’s action. There probably would be considerable debate over both God’s action on the world-as-a-whole and it on the parts of the world. Perhaps one solution is in the Gaia hypothesis where the world has holistic influence on its parts.^{^[ix]} Peacocke, on the other hand, says the effects of God on the world appear minimal, barely noticeable. He believes the higher the level on the hierarchy, the less noticeable will be its holistic effects on the lower.

Peacocke’s claim that we should not expect to observe down-trickling providence raises problems. For instance, it depends on what God is doing. If God is raising Jesus from the dead, we would observe an intervention. If after prayer Marlene recovers completely from a disease that has always been fatal, there is a break in the regular course of nature. Perhaps Peacocke can give up these events as miraculous. Perhaps for Peacocke Jesus did not physically rise from the dead - a position that may follow from his idea of providence (see Nelson 1991, 522; and Peacocke 1991, 537).

There is a stronger instance of God’s providence. God is the origin and source for the existence of everything, their sustainer moment by moment. Nothing could have more of an effect.

This is an important problem and points to a weakness in Peacocke’s model. If theology wishes to be consistent in its picture of God, making God’s actions as obvious as in theory they should be, then it needs to point out clearly the actions of God. They must be obvious if theology is to present God as having a marked effect on anybody’s life and on the world. This need is part of the point made about the levels model. Theology should emphasize the mutual relevance between itself and science, between God and world. For this to happen something must obviously be the work of God and not come only under science.

(10) The causal joint. The causal joint problem resurfaces with God’s top-down causation. Peacocke feels he might sidestep it by suggesting, as does Polkinghorne, that God uses information to influence events. This would replace God’s directly changing events from what they would have been or influencing chance results. The alternatives require energy transfer and break the conservation laws of science - energy cannot come from nowhere. God’s sending information and a unit of a lower level receiving and processing that information does not require energy transfer.

On the other hand, it does require the receiver to store, process and understand the information. It then has to act on it. These require the receiver to use extra energy. Thus, relying on information flow may not solve the causal joint problem, as Peacocke acknowledges in a footnote (Peacocke 1990, 59-61, 164, 207 n. 62; see also Polkinghorne, e.g., 1991, 233). It further assumes the receiver has the means to store, process and understand the information.

Paul Davies questioned Basil Hiley over a similar matter, the quantum information potential. This is the theory Hiley and David Bohm developed as an alternative to the usual Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics. The quantum information potential is holistic and acts on objects such as electrons to make them behave in peculiarly quantum ways (see Sharpe In Press 1). Davies asked where the electron gets the energy from for its quantum behavior as informed by the potential. In reply, Hiley suggests it comes from the energy of the background vacuum (Davies and Brown 1986, 140). Would Peacocke suggest the extra energy for God’s down-trickling providence comes from the same source? It could be grasping at straws.

One also should consider whether the system containing the causal joint is open or closed. If it is open - as the brain probably is - then the conservation of energy does not apply. The causal joint problem may not apply to that system.

An Alternative to Peacocke’s Theory

If theology and science are to be mutually relevant, Peacocke and other users of a levels model should answer points (1) to (5) above. He also faces problems (6) through (10) with his model based on Sperry’s.

Further, Peacocke’s position does not do justice to a twin emphasis in the Christian understanding of God. Not only is God at the top, being transcendent - something the levels model speaks to. God is also at the bottom of the chains of levels, or throughout the complex system of the world, by being immanent and the sustainer. As the most elemental matter is the base for every object, so God is the base for everything. As we partly understand anything by the way its parts behave, so we partly understand anything by its being a product of God. God is at the bottom and seeps back through to the top. These twin functions do not fit the levels model with its God at the top or end of the hierarchy of levels, totally transcending the world.^{^[x]}

An alternative to Peacocke’s idea of God starts by accepting a levels model for the world and not for the God-world relation. It takes from Sperry’s model the idea that the mind is the brain-as-a-whole and says God is the universe-as-a-whole. The whole that is God also acts on the parts of the universe in a top-down holistic way. This speaks to God’s transcendence.

Since the whole contains the parts and we normally think the world is self-sufficient, performing its events without outside help, God is also the doer of all events. All events are both natural and God at work. Everything is in God. Thus, this model speaks to God’s bottom-up action (by God being the doer of all events) - that is, God’s immanence - as much as God’s top-down transcendent action.

The model needs a metaphysical base to make it more useful. Then it needs to make its sense of God’s transcendence as strong as that of the Judeo-Christian tradition. There are also obvious questions to answer such as the problem of evil and human freedom.^{^[xi]}

How does this model handle the points and problems I raised above? Note that, rather than having a God-world hierarchy of levels, it has a hierarchy of the world-as-a-whole (that is, God) and the world. So while it does not use the levels model in the same way, it could still have similar problems. Looking at the first five points, one can see numbers (3), (4) and (5) are more pertinent.

(3) Theology should work out how God can act on and in the world consistent with both its own theories and with those of science. Saying God is the doer of all events does not contradict any scientific laws or interfere with any of its theories. Neither does it do so for theology since it already has the belief that God is the sustainer. On the other hand, this emphasis highlights a problem theology already has: how does the belief in God the sustainer relate to those of free will and the existence of evil? When I say theology should work out how God can act consistent with its own theories, I mean that the parts of a developing theology need to be consistent. It is not a matter of taking a fixed theology and adding new parts to it consistent with what was there.

This points to a result of this approach. If God is the sustainer, then the world reflects the nature of God and we could examine it to see what God is like. Traditional properties of and puzzles about God might not withstand this scrutiny. I have written before on theodicy in the light of this process (Sharpe In Press 2).

There is a second way God works. The holistic interactions by which the world-as-a-whole acts on the parts of the world are also God at work. This follows from the definition of God. The question then is whether the world-as-a-whole does interact holistically with parts of the world. At present there are few such interactions in scientific theory, but they may become more widespread. (See discussions on the wave function of the universe - that is, applying quantum mechanics to the whole of the universe as in cosmology’s deliberation of the very early universe - the anthropic principle, the Gaia hypothesis, and so on.) Theologians may want to say more about how God the world-as-a-whole interacts with the world, for instance by giving God personal properties. The theology I envision, however, would only go further like this in ways consistent with science.

There is a third type of action by God that theology may seek: divine interventions. I am cautious about this. The world described by actual and potential science would have to allow for and support interventions if theology is to consider them. Traditional ideas invoking intervention may be hypotheses, but they need not be the results of the inquiry.

(4) There must be problems with the explanatory power of science. Above I suggested there are problems in cosmology - the origin of the basic laws of nature, for instance - where theology may help. I have also applied this theological approach to them in another publication (Sharpe n.d. 1). This is only one problem where theology might help.

(5) Theology should then work back into itself how God acts on and in the world. The metaphysics I propose for developing the model of God as the world-as-a-whole works well with the cosmology problem just mentioned. Since these are extensive topics, I will not explain them further but refer to other essays (Sharpe n.d. 1 and n.d. 2).

Continuing with the questions I raised of Peacocke’s model, points (7), (9) and (10) are pertinent.

(7) The status of Sperry’s mind-brain model, and the certainty of its theological adaptation. I have not based this theology on an analogy to Sperry’s model so I am not trying to import its certainty. It may help, but there are other holistic interaction models - Bohm and Hiley’s is one example - that also may be useful. The holistic interactions of the world-as-a-whole that we already know about may help as well. Theological adaptations of these models become suggestions open to examination.

Note that Sperry’s model especially suits Peacocke because it uses personal language for the whole that carries over to personal language for God. While such language may be proper for the whole that is God, there are reasons for using it that do not depend on Sperry’s model. This is something I raise in my fuller discussion of the model of God as the world-as-a-whole (Sharpe n.d. 2).

(9) The reality of the theological model’s top-down causation. I asked where Peacocke’s model of down-trickling providence might lead one to observe God’s action. For the model I suggest, one need not look very far for God’s action as every event is God at work. Second, a theology using holistic God-world interactions should try to explain widespread experiences if God’s acts are to be real for people. This is different from Peacocke’s theology of a down-trickling providence one will probably not notice.

(10) The causal joint. The holistic models of science should answer their causal joint problems, perhaps by looking at whether the systems are open or closed. These models may then become candidates for the God-world relation.

Thus the God-world model I suggest as an alternative to Peacocke’s may answer the problems raised above.

Conclusion

I have urged caution over using the levels model for the science-theology relation and for the God-world relation. That the levels model applies to the natural world (including human beings) does not automatically mean it applies to the other areas. If theologians do use it, they need to be clear about the relations between the levels. They also should take care to insure the mutual relevance of science and theology, God and world.

These points about the levels model also may hold for its use beyond theology, provided mutual relevance is important.

To the levels model Peacocke adds his theory of top-down causation, creating the idea of down-trickling providence. I have raised several questions about this too.

I do not want to lessen the value of Peacocke’s work on the God-world relation. He makes important contributions in facing and trying to understand it for this science-informed culture. I hope my reflections will help strengthen his work.

Notes

References

Austin, William H. 1976. The Relevance of Natural Science to

Theology. New York: Barnes & Noble Books.

Davies, P. C. W., and J. R. Brown, eds. 1986. The Ghost in the

Atom: A Discussion of the Mysteries of Quantum Physics.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Halliwell, Jonathan J. 1991. “Quantum Cosmology and the Creation

of the Universe.” Scientific American 265 (December): 76-

85.

MacKay, Donald M. 1958. “Complementarity II.” Aristotelian

Society, Supplemental Volume 32 (July): 105-22.

________. 1974. “~~~~’Complementarity’ in Scientific and

Theological Thinking.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and

Science 9 (September): 225-44.

McDonald, Marvin J. 1989. “Exploring ‘Levels of Explanation’

Concepts. Part I: Interactions Between Ontic and Epistemic

Levels.” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith:

Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 41

(December): 194-205.

________. 1990. “Exploring ‘Levels of Explanation’ Concepts.

Part II: Levels in Science-Religion Dialogue.” Perspectives

on Science and Christian Faith: Journal of the American

Scientific Affiliation 42 (March): 23-33.

McMullin, Ernan. 1981. “How Should Cosmology Relate to

Theology?” In The Sciences and Theology in the

Twentieth Century, ed. A. R. Peacocke, 17-57. Notre Dame,

IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Nelson, James S. 1991. “Does Science Clarify God’s Relation to

the World?” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 26

(December): 519-25.

Peacocke, Arthur. 1990. Theology for a Scientific Age: Being

and Becoming - Natural and Divine. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

________. 1991. “Concluding Reflection.” Zygon: Journal of

Religion and Science 26 (December): 527-40.

Polkinghorne, John C. 1991. “The Nature of Physical Reality.”

Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 26 (June): 221-36.

Reich, K. Helmut. 1990. “The Relation Between Science and

Theology: The Case for Complementarity Revisited.” Zygon:

Journal of Religion and Science 25 (December): 369-90.

Schilling, Harold K. 1973. The New Consciousness in Science and

Religion. Philadelphia, PA: Pilgrim Press.

Sharpe, Kevin J. 1979. “Theological Method and Gordon Kaufman.”

Religious Studies 15 (June): 173-90.

________. 1984. From Science to an Adequate Mythology.

Auckland: Interface Press.

________. 1991. “Relating Science and Theology with

Complementarity: A Caution.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and

Science 26 (June): 307-13.

________. In Press 1. David Bohm’s World: New Physics and New

Religion. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press.

________. In Press 2. “Sociobiology and Evil.” In The Biology of

Morality, ed. James Hurd.

________. n.d. 1. “The Creative and Purposeful God in a Big Bang

Universe: Cosmology, Holomovement and Sociobiology.”

Preprint.

________. n.d. 2. “A Theology Based on David Bohm’s Holomovement

Metaphysics.” Preprint.

Sperry, R. W. 1991. “Search for Beliefs to Live by Consistent

with Science.” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 26

(June): 237-58.

AUTHOR’S FOOTNOTE. Kevin J. Sharpe is a professor in the Graduate School of the Union Institute. His mailing address is 65 Hoit Road, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, USA.